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“BAD COP” DIPLOMACY & PREEMPTION: AN
ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
POLITICS GOVERNING WEAPONS
PROLIFERATION
INTRODUCTION
October 4, 2002, North Korea nullifies the Agreed Framework
not to develop nuclear weapons and admitted that it had been working on a nuclear weapons program since 1997;1 March 21, 2003, the
United States invades Iraq partially on the rationale of preemptive
self-defense, arguing such an invasion was necessary to stop Iraq from
developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD);2 December 17,
2003, Iran signs an agreement allowing intrusive inspections of its nuclear sites and says it is giving up its nuclear program after receiving
international condemnation for its programs;3 December 19, 2003,
Libya reaches an agreement with the United States and Great Britain
to give up its WMD programs and allowing unfettered inspections.4
With the first date, we see the questionable effectiveness of nuclear
control regimes that are based on good faith; with the second, the
United States for the first time used preemption as a mechanism to
control WMD proliferation; and with the last two, we can see how
compliance can be brought to bear by a reorientation of international
regimes with a more outcome-oriented doctrine of preemptive selfdefense.

1. VICTOR D. CHA & DAVID C. KANG, NUCLEAR NORTH KOREA 132 (2003). As this
Note was being published North Korea admitted that it had nuclear weapons and that it would
not participate in further multi-party negotiations. James Brooke & David E. Sanger, North
Korea Says They Hold Nuclear Arms, N.Y TIMES, Feb. 11, 2005, at A1. This revolation makes
the policies analyzed in this Note all the more pressing.
2. BBC News, Invasion Force Pushes into Iraq, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/
2872325.stm (Mar. 21, 2003) (last visited June 18, 2004).
3. Nazila Fathi, Iran to Sign Inspection Pact on Atomic Sites, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at
A24.
4. George W. Bush, Remarks of the President, Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031219-9.html (last visited June
19, 2004).
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Nuclear weapons provide a unique vantage point by which one
can examine the salience of international law in controlling state conduct. International law often cannot be properly enforced against
states who have a great deal of freedom to initiate actions in derogation of their international obligations and suffer no repercussions if
the risk and cost of enforcement is too high. This note copes with the
question of how to fill the void traditional international law has faced
in dealing with the threat of weapons proliferation.
While the goal for this note could be considered overly ambitious
and broad, it provides needed perspective at the current crossroads of
nuclear policy. In this note, I will first lay out the international political theories that have been used in the past to address the threat
posed by nuclear weapons, including deterrence, counterforce, and
nonproliferation. After looking at the underlying rationale for each
of these theories, as well as criticisms of each, our analysis turns to the
role international law has had in providing leadership and serving as a
catalyst to end the use of nuclear weapons. By looking at treaty law,
customary law, as well as court decisions, it becomes clear that international law has taken the view that the use of nuclear weapons are
5
almost always proscribed. While that topic may be relatively settled,
what must be asked is whether international law’s determination is
relevant when there are many divergent perspectives regarding the
lawful use of force. Third, this note will analyze the Bush administration’s National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction and
question whether its reliance on preemptive self-defense (the Bush
Doctrine) will provide a better paradigm to limit the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction.6 Fourth, this note provides a case-bycase application of the Bush Doctrine to the factual realities of the
war in Iraq, the conflict with North Korea, and the proposed settlements with Libya and Iran to determine when preemptive selfdefense would be permissible and when it is actually practical. Fifth, I
will propose an alternative system where nonproliferation regimes
teamed with preemptive self-defense can provide the necessary legitimacy that is currently lacking under both the nuclear nonprolifera-

5. See generally ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 95 (July 8), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/
iunanframe.htm [hereinafter Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons]
(last visited June 19, 2004).
6. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (Dec. 2002), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf (last visited June 16,
2004).
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tion regime of the past several decades and the preemptive attack
paradigm advocated by the current administration. A discussion of
these elements will provide a fuller understanding of the interaction
between international politics, international law, and the current realities of the nuclear threat.
I. INTERNATIONAL POLITICS PARADIGMS
REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Numerous paradigms have been proposed to control the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons. Any effort to grasp the current legal realities must be grounded in an understanding of how nuclear
weapons are perceived by states. It is additionally important to look
at the drawbacks to these perspectives because of their reemergence
and integration under modern nuclear control doctrines. While these
perspectives may be considered entirely within the camp of international politics or war strategy, they are key elements of opinio juris
that will aid in evaluating the state action (or rather inaction) regarding the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons over the course of the
Cold War.
A. Deterrence
Shortly after the United States’ first use of nuclear weapons in
Japan, the Soviet Union joined the United States as a nuclear super7
power. The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union was based on the understanding that any activity by one actor
would result in an act of retaliation, and likely complete destruction,
by the other party.8 Nuclear deterrence is understood as “the threat
of nuclear attack as retaliation, to prevent the opponent from using
9
violence against the vital interests of the deterrer.” Thus, nuclear

7. PETER MALANCZUK, AKEHURST’S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1997).
8. For a discussion on the effect of nuclear weapons of the relationship and actions of the
United States and the Soviet Union, see John Mueller, The Essential Irrelevance of Nuclear
Weapons: Stability in a Postwar World, in THE COLD WAR AND AFTER: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE
43, 43–60 (Sean M. Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller eds., 1993) (arguing that numerous factors
such as a general fear of fighting any war was the key to the deterrence during the Cold War);
Robert Jervis, The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons: A Comment, in THE COLD WAR AND
AFTER: PROSPECTS FOR PEACE 70, 70–80 (Sean M. Lynn-Jones & Steven E. Miller eds,. 1993)
(arguing that nuclear weapons were the key to deterrence during the Cold War by looking at
key events such as the Cuban Missile Crisis and statements of Reagan and Gorbachev that “a
war that cannot be won should never be fought”).
9. TOM SAUER, NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL 1 (1998).
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weapons were not only thought of as an offensive weapon to be used
in an effort to win a war, but rather primarily thought of as defensive
10
measures to prevent war.
Yet nuclear deterrence is not something that exists automatically
simply from the creation of nuclear weapons. There are a number of
key assumptions that nuclear deterrence theory is based upon: (1) the
opponent is susceptible to deterrence (that meaning they are not irrational, fundamentalists, or risk takers); (2) the opponent has vital interests (limiting deterrence to state actors who have tangible, vital in11
terests); and (3) the threat of use of nuclear weapons is credible.
These three assumptions work ideally when there are two state actors
who both have nuclear weapons, as was evident during the Cold War.
In such a case, both actors know that any use of nuclear weapons on
their part will almost assuredly result in retaliation such that there
would be no realistic plan under which one could achieve victory.
Even after disarmament from Cold War highs, the United States
maintains 8,425 operational nuclear weapons and Russia maintains
10,240 operational weapons.12 Deterrence appears to remain the posi13
tion at the center of nuclear arms control.
The popularity of deterrence theory has long been controversial
and it has become even more so after the end of the Cold War. The
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Legality of Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons case opined that the problem underpinning deterrence is that in order for it to work people must be willing to use nu14
clear weapons freely to deter an attack. Second, as technology develops to the point where nuclear weapons can be produced by nonstate actors such as terrorist groups, the principle of a limited multipolar system is clearly undermined.15 Additionally, these groups do
not have “rational” or “vital interests” like those of state actors as

10. Id. at 1–2.
11. Id. at 3–10.
12. CHARLES J. MOXLEY, JR., NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE
POST COLD WAR WORLD 555 (2000).
13. SAUER, supra note 9, at 1.
14. Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, at ¶ 48
(“In order to be effective, the policy of deterrence, by which those States possessing or under
the umbrella of nuclear weapons seek to discourage military aggression by demonstrating that it
will serve no purpose, necessitates that the intention to use nuclear weapons be credible.”).
15. George Rathjens, Nuclear Proliferation Following the NPT Extension, in THE
NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION REGIME 30–31 (Raju G.C. Thomas ed., 1998) (noting that the
price of acquiring sufficient enriched uranium to produce a nuclear weapon has fallen from
$400,000 in 1979 to a tenth of that today).
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such groups often fight for a cause rather than the traditional rational
goals typical of states. Third, as state actors who have nuclear weapons increase in number and heterogeneity, the ability to create an effective deterrence system lessens as many states will not be evenly
matched as nuclear competitors, negating the underpinnings that all
parties view the risk-reward calculus of using nuclear weapons virtually identically.16 Therefore, the assumptions upon which deterrence
17
has been based have effectively been eroded.
Beyond the theoretical problems that face deterrence, there is
fear of the secondary effects that result from a policy of deterrence.
Among these are the fear that if weapons exist, they will eventually
be used; that they will foster an arms race and nuclear proliferation;
and they will provide risks for terrorism, human and equipment failure, and environmental concerns resulting from the long-term storage
18
of existing weapons. These fears are compounded by the tangible
monetary cost of maintaining a nuclear program that is never in19
tended to be used. With changes to the nuclear climate, the practicality of deterrence has evolved to the point where many currently
question its potency in rationalizing the continued existence of nuclear weapons. However, as will be discussed later, the Bush administration has breathed new life into the deterrence doctrine as it is still
seen as a reasonable way of explanation of the sixty year period
where nuclear weapons have not been used.
B. Nonproliferation & Counterproliferation
After tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union
reached a near boiling point, it became clear for all parties that measures needed to be implemented to control the spread of nuclear
16. Sumit Ganguly, Behind India’s Bomb: The Politics and Strategy of Nuclear Deterrence,
FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001, at 135 (book review) (analyzing a system where states that have
fledgling nuclear programs will conceptualize deterrence in a more real way to ward off any
possible attack or threat to their interests).
17. The United States has admitted that groups like al-Qaeda were working toward and
had plans for the development of nuclear weapons. See Office of Press Secretary, Fact Sheet:
Day 100 on the War on Terrorism: More Steps to Shut Down Terrorist Networks, The White
House, Dec. 20, 2001, at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/01122004.htm (last visited June
16, 2004).
18. MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 533–48.
19. David Silverberg, America’s Nuclear Arsenal: $5.5 Trillion Well-Spent, The Brookings
Institute, July 8, 1998, at http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/nucwcost/silverberg.htm (noting the
cost of maintaining nuclear weapons programs in a post Cold War era is $25 billion dollars a
year and the overall cost of nuclear programs amounts to ten percent of the entire defense
budget) (last visited June 16, 2004).
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weapons. This concern was embodied in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in which a plan to control nuclear
20
weapons development was created. It is important to note that nonproliferation is an international treaty obligation as well as an international political conception for dealing with nuclear weapons. This
treaty also became central in the ICJ decision regarding nuclear
weapons, discussed below.
The treaty sets out a number of provisions addressing the spread
of nuclear weapons. First, the members undertake to not directly or
indirectly pass nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices to other
states.21 Second, it provides for safeguards for “non-weapon” states
that do not seek such weapons.22 Third, all parties agree to pursue
“good faith” negotiations to end the use of nuclear weapons and
23
bring about eventual complete nuclear disarmament.
In 1995, the members of the NPT agreed to the indefinite exten24
sion of the agreement. This agreement has been lauded by many as
the best possible avenue for eliminating the existence of nuclear
25
weapons at some point in the future. It has served as the basis of the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) between the
United States and the Soviet Union, which have resulted in large reductions in nuclear stockpiles.26 It has also provided the basis for nu-

20. Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 1968, art. I, available at
http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf (last visited June 16, 2004).
21. Id. art. I. While not a member of the NPT, the actions of Pakistan in providing weapons technology to member countries has been troubling in recent news. See William J. Broad et
al., A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Built His Network, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
2004, at A1 (detailing the extent and means by which Pakistan spread weapons technology);
David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, Pakistani’s Nuclear Earnings: $100 Million, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 2004, at A12 (noting that clandestine sales of weapons to Libya alone netted Pakistan
$100 million).
22. Id. art. II.
23. Id. art. VI.
24. Extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Dec. 3, 1995,
available at http://disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/1995dec3.htm (last visited June 16, 2004).
25. See generally, e.g., JOHN BURROUGHS, THE LEGALITY OF THE THREAT OR USE OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A GUIDE TO THE HISTORIC OPINION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE (1998) (emphasizing the importance of the nonproliferation regimes at forcing nuclear states to negotiate the end of the use of nuclear weapons); Joseph F. Pilat & Charles W.
Nakhleh, A Treaty Reborn? The NPT After Extension, in THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
REGIME 41 (Raju G.C. Thomas ed., 1998) (opining with cautious optimism that the NPT will be
able to control the spread and supplement counter-proliferation measures).
26. For more information regarding the status and details of these treaties, see Defense
Threat Reduction Agency, http://www.dtra.mil/os/ops/nuclear/os_npt.html (last updated Jan. 9,
2001) (last visited June 19, 2004).
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clear states to help non-nuclear states remain nuclear free by provid27
ing economic incentives to remain so.
While remaining the primary regime dealing with the spread of
nuclear weapons technology, nonproliferation has become increasingly difficult to maintain and has essentially broken down because of
the actions of several states. Shortly after the extension of NPT, both
28
India and Pakistan declared their nuclear capabilities. The discovery
after the first Gulf War of nuclear weapons research in Iraq, in violation of its obligations under the NPT, fueled further concern about
the realistic nature of any nonproliferation regime without stronger
compliance mechanisms.29 The most recent and possibly damning
event for the NPT regime is North Korea’s announcement that it is a
nuclear state after years of concerted efforts to prevent Pyongyang
from developing such weapons by providing numerous concessions.30
Each of these events points to the key problem that has always accompanied the NPT regime—the lack of an enforcement mechanism.
Because of the absence of this important element, good faith remains
the basis for its enforcement, and as is evident in the recent developments in North Korea, good faith is woefully inadequate when a
rogue state can more easily decide that attaining weapons of mass destruction is in its best interest.31
The obligations of nuclear states to continue negotiations to reduce nuclear stockpiles have also stalled. While more successful recently, the United States and Russia have had a difficult time completing further bilateral negotiations to cut their nuclear stockpiles.32
27. A notable situation of this is the work of the United States and the Soviet Union in
providing pressure in preventing India and Pakistan from getting nuclear technology for many
years. Additionally the difficulty in getting nuclear weapons technology after the NPT helped
stop nuclear programs in Argentina and Brazil. Rathjens, supra note 15, at 34. It must be noted
that India and Pakistan were not members of the NPT but this speaks to the competence of the
regime to deal with critical states.
28. See Associated Press, Nuclear History in India Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 1998,
available at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/nuchist.htm (providing a timeline of the development of nuclear weapons between India and Pakistan) (last visited June 19, 2004).
29. Rathjens, supra note 15, at 35.
30. Point of No Return, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 26, 2003; see discussion infra beginning with
note 130; Brooks and Sanger, supra note 1.
31. For a discussion of how to approach a heterogeneous state system regarding ambition
on attaining nuclear weapons, see Rathjens, supra note 15, at 32–34.
32. While there have been agreements regarding the cuts in nuclear weapons numbers,
other areas of nuclear technology (most notably ABM) have made weapons cuts unstable. The
slowness in cuts has been frustrating for non-nuclear states. David E. Sanger, The Bush-Putin
Summit: The Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2001, at A1; Steven Lee Myers, Bush in First Step to
Shrink Arsenal of U.S. Warheads, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at A1. But see Ronald Timerbaev
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The United States withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
(ABM), another component in the nonproliferation regime, in late
33
2001. As the United States continues to take a more unilateralist
view on the enforcement of what it sees as its rights and obligations
under international law, the future viability of multilateral disarmament is in much doubt.
C. Counterforce
The principle that a nuclear war can and should never be fought
(the basis of deterrence theory) has been challenged by experts that
feel nuclear weapons can be used effectively in certain circumstances
and the United States must prepare to defend against the possibility
of a limited nuclear attack. This concept of limited nuclear war is
known as counterforce.
Counterforce has long been considered as one approach to the
threat of nuclear weapons as well as when and in what matter such
weapons can be used. The United States and the Soviet Union both
have at one point created counterforce scenarios outside of their basic
deterrence strategy of Mutually Assured Destruction; however the
original conception of the limited use of nuclear weapons was hard to
call “limited.”34
Yet as nuclear technology has developed so that the breadth of
any nuclear impact can be limited, the United States has taken several
steps to develop nuclear technology that would allow for a realistic
counterforce initiative. The United States’ understanding that nuclear weapons can be used in limited situations on small targets is evident from the development of weapons like the nuclear tipped, “bunker busting” Trident bomb that can penetrate deep below the surface
& Vladimir Orlov, Concerted Action Needed on Nonproliferation, THE MOSCOW TIMES, Apr.
19, 2000, available at http://www.pircenter.org/board/article.php3?artid=288 (noting distrust by
the Russians over the status of nonproliferation agreements with the United States) (last visited
June 16, 2004).
33. For more information regarding the debate surrounding the ABM debate, see John
Newhouse, The Missile Defense Debate, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2001, at 97.
34. See MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 426–30 stating:
Even under the most favorable assumptions it appeared that between 2 and 20 million
Europeans would be killed, even from a very limited nuclear attack, with widespread
damage to the economy of the affected area and a high risk of 100 million dead if the
war escalated to attacks on cities. (US attack)
The attack, while designed to inflict the maximum economic damage while minimizing
the attack size, would have killed some 20 million Americans immediately and injured
another 5 million . . . [with a]t worst a modest nuclear attack. . . induc[ing] a permanent
collapse of the U.S. economy . . . .
(Soviet attack)
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to destroy targets underground that are unreachable with conven35
tional weaponry. The United States Defense Department states that
such weaponry is necessary to fill a gap that exists in the ability to
fight entrenched opponents.36
A second way that counterforce has influenced United States nuclear policy is in the development of a missile defense mechanism,
such as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).37 Originally initiated
by President Ronald Reagan in 1983, such a mechanism was believed
to provide the United States with “something that would render [nuclear] weapons obsolete.”38 While critics contend that such a program
will never work, the plan embodies the belief that Mutually Assured
Destruction is an unsound theory for a country with other available
defense options.39 While SDI and programs like it have been conceptualized in many different ways,40 it remains a key component of the
United States strategy for addressing the nuclear threat.41
Counterforce measures have been attacked on a number of levels. First, no matter how limited the initial use of nuclear weapons,
there is a substantial fear of the escalation to a broader nuclear conflict.42 Additionally, with the changing nature of potential enemies
and their means of attack, counterforce measures are likely unable to

35. See generally J.D. Crouch, Nuclear Posture Review: Hearing Before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/n01092002_
200201094.html (Jan. 9, 2002) (last visited June 19, 2004).
36. Id.
37. However, development of the new SDI system has suffered continual setbacks and
there is concern that systems will be deployed before technology is adequately tested and developed. See Bradley Graham, U.S. Missile Defense Test Fails, Dec. 16, 2004, at A5 (reporting recent failures of missiles tests to intercept their targets).
38. Transcript of Reagan News Session on Social Security and Missile Defense, N.Y TIMES,
Mar. 26, 1983, at A1.
39. See generally ELLIOTT L. MEYROWITZ, PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: THE
RELEVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1989) (stating the history and basis behind the development of SDI).
40. For a complete timeline and history of United States missile defense programs, see
Daniel Smith, Chronology of U.S. National Missile Defense Programs, at
http://www.cdi.org/hotspots/issuebrief/ch9/index.html (last visited June 19, 2004).
41. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra note 6, at 3 (Dec.
2002) (stating the need for a vigorous air defense and effective missile defense against today’s
threats).
42. See JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-12 DOCTRINE FOR JOINT NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS, I-5–I-6, available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_12.pdf (Dec.
15, 1995) (last visited June 19, 2004); MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 595–598 (providing numerous
quotations from government officials, military experts, and academics opining that any sort of
limited use of weapons will not be successful).

FINAL KLEIN.DOC

398

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

3/8/2005 9:45 AM

[Vol 14:389

effectively address unconventional attacks, especially those from non43
state actors.
The above rationales governing the world since the first use of
nuclear weapons provide insight into the numerous paradigms currently employed to manage the existence of nuclear weapons. While
these theories do not provide a specific single response to nuclear
weapons and the threat of their use, they provide valuable context
and an understanding of how states currently perceive the role of nuclear weapons. This in turn aids in effectively analyzing whether the
use or threat of use of such weapons is lawful and the significance of
such a determination.
II. INTERNATIONAL LAW REGARDING
NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Treaties and customs that represent the collective views of the belligerents have been developed throughout history. These principles
protect combatants and noncombatants, safeguard human rights,
and facilitate the restoration of peace. These treaties and customs
44
make up the law of armed conflict.

While international political theory provides several rationales
both for and against the use of nuclear weapons, international law
standards are also applicable. It is important to remember that there
are a number of applicable principles regarding the use or threat of
use of nuclear weapons; however the scope of this note is limited to
the humanitarian law principles of proportionality, necessity, and discrimination. This section provides an overview of each of these legal
principles, along with an attempt to parse out how they apply to the
nuclear threat and, ultimately, how nuclear weapons have affected
the legitimacy of international law.
Indeed, it is important to note that this is an area of international
law where positive and customary law come together. Humanitarian
law is governed under the principle called the Martens Clause:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war is issued, the high
contracting Parties think it is right to declare that in cases not included in the Regulations adopted by them, populations and belligerents remain under the protection and empire of the principles of

43. James Dao, Defense Secretary Warns of Unconventional Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2001, at B5 (warning that terrorist groups could use nuclear dirty bombs to attack the United
States).
44. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, JOINT PUB. 3-12.1 DOCTRINE FOR JOINT THEATER NUCLEAR
OPERATIONS, v, available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/usa/doctrine/dod/jp3_12_1.pdf (Feb.
9, 1996) (last visited June 19, 2004) .
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international law, as they result from the usages established between civilized nations, from the laws of humanity and the re45
quirements of the public conscience.

For this reason and because of the necessary limited scope of this
note, the principles that govern international law are going to be discussed at the same time in order to draw out their essential elements.
Only after drawing out these principles will the difficult issue of customary international law as applied to nuclear weapons be discussed.
Additionally, because of the all- encompassing effect the use nuclear
weapons would have, it is important to acknowledge up front that
there is inherent overlap between these principles, which makes it difficult to parse them into discrete elements.
A. Rule of Proportionality
Principles of international law require that the use of force be
46
generally proportionate to the threat that exists. In order to examine whether nuclear weapons can meet this principle, one must look
at (1) the potential threats that could exist for a state contemplating
the use of these weapons and (2) the amount of damage that would
result from the use of the weapons.
As was discussed in the first part of this note, there have been
many different incarnations of the perceived threat that would allow
the use of nuclear weapons. However, when we get below the level of
complete destruction of a state, it becomes harder to determine what
other threats could allow the use of nuclear weapons. Looking to history, the United States’ use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and
Nagasaki in the waning days of World War II was based on a fear that
the war would drag on indefinitely and tens of thousands of Americans and Japanese would die in an invasion of Japan.47 From this rationale, it would appear that the limited use of nuclear weapons for
tactical purposes could be justified, but the single use of such weapons
under this rationale makes it extremely difficult to establish a customary norm of what qualifies as a proper threat.
The second element proposed above considering the amount of
damage the use of nuclear weapons would entail, once again forces
one to look at the state of nuclear technology. The United States, in
its argument to the ICJ and in its actions in developing limited nu45. Preamble, Hague Convention II (July 29, 1899) (emphasis added).
46. HISAKAZU FUJITA, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR
WEAPONS, 33–37 (1988).
47. BURROUGHS, supra note 25, at 67; MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 26.
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clear weapons, opines that current nuclear policies are built upon a
false belief that nuclear weapons can only be used indiscriminately on
48
a large-scale basis. If a country can limit the use of a nuclear device
to a small area, the proportionality necessary for its use must be re49
calibrated to properly account for the weapons’ true effect. However, it is important to note the fear of escalation that can result from
any use of nuclear weapons. Additionally, the fallout that will result
from their limited suggests such limited use may not fully conceive of
possible inherent secondary dangers.50 Supporting this is the evidence
of long-term environmental damage and disease surrounding nuclear
blast sites such as at Bikini Atoll and in Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
which were relatively low-yield nuclear weapons relative to the
weapons of today.51 If the nature of the qualitative damage that results from nuclear weapons is too great, this element would likely
overwhelm any justified use of such weapons.
Tying these two aspects of proportionality together suggests a
sliding scale that depends on the type of nuclear weapon used and the
rationale for its use. It will become increasingly difficult to judge
proportionality as new limited weapons are developed, likely opening
the door to new possible arguments for their use.
52

B. Rule of Necessity

Nuclear weapons should only be used when conventional weapons would not suffice in meeting the military objective in question,
and any use of force beyond that would be illegal.53 The United
States military specifically acknowledges that because of the direct
and secondary fallout that would likely result from the use of nuclear
weapons, their use would likely violate the rule of necessity.54 The
principle of necessity is a long-standing doctrine that was used in ob-

48. Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, at ¶ 91.
49. FUJITA, supra note 46, at 40.
50. BURROUGHS, supra note 25, at 67.
51. MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 430–433 (acknowledging the problems that have resulted
from the long-term affects of exposure to nuclear fallout include babies born without bones and
transparent skin. This has been noted in humans and other species as well).
52. Please note that there is a also a rule of moderation that applies to the use of force.
The Hague Regulations Article 22 states that “the right of belligerent to adopt a means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited.” Encompassed in the discussion in this section of necessity is
also the rule of moderation that force needs to be used in as limited a way as possible, and that
going beyond such an means would be a violation of the rule of moderation.
53. MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 52.
54. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 44, at v–vi.
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taining convictions in the Nuremberg and Yugoslavia tribunals. Es55
sentially force that cannot be controlled may not legally be used.
Additionally, attached to this principle is the belief that soldiers are
constrained in their behavior while fighting a war and that there will
be repercussions for actions beyond those accepted as legitimately
necessary.56
When nuclear weapons are looked at through the lens of necessity, some contend that their destructive capacity will always make
57
their use illegitimate. However, these assertions do point to a key
challenge for those advocating the use of nuclear weapons—any mili58
tary objective must survive the necessity requirement. If the use of
the weapon can provide no benefit to the state employing them, it is
59
very difficult to say that using such a weapon is necessary. As military technology has developed and the use of nuclear technologies for
limited purposes, such as penetrating underground targets unreachable with conventional weapons, the components of a legitimate limited military nuclear objective begin to emerge.60 The use of largescale missiles and the destruction that would result from their use is
much harder to grasp under this principle. It has been held that use
of large-scale nuclear weapons would only be allowable to preserve
the existence of the state, but others claim that even this limited circumstance is not permissible given the mass destruction that would
result from large-scale nuclear engagements.61 For these reasons, the
use of nuclear weapons under the necessity analysis is highly dependent upon the surrounding facts and circumstances of the limited capacity of the weapon and the means of attacking the target in question.

55. For a brief outline of the principle of necessity as applied in the Nuremberg Tribunals
and International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, see Leif Tore Mickelson, Military Ethics from the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and of the Former Yugoslavia; a dissertation Proposal, available at http://www.accts.org/ethics/norway/michelst.htm (last
visited June 20, 2004); MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 52.
56. See id.
57. BURROUGHS, supra note 25, at 96–97; MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 57.
58. MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 57.
59. Id.
60. Crouch, supra note 35.
61. See supra notes 34–43 and accompanying text for discussion on counterforce; the issue
of the limited use of nuclear weapons was presented to the International Counter of Justice and
is discussed infra.
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C. Rule of Discrimination
Elemental to the fighting of wars is the goal of destroying the
opponent’s army. Within this goal is the principle that the object of
an attack should not be to attack civilians and to protect them to the
62
extent practicable. Thus, the use of a weapon, despite being focused
on a military target, that has a disproportionate impact on civilians
would be considered improperly discriminatory under international
law. Indeed, Article 48 of the First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions states:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between the civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
63
shall direct their operations only against military objectives.

Some have tried to distinguish discrimination in the nuclear context in
a way that does not entirely distinguish in a classic, absolute division
between combatants and noncombatants. The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings are used as examples for a more discretionary reading of what discrimination should mean. While many will simply attack the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings as a violation of
64
international law and end their argument, it would be disingenuous
not to analyze these events further to see how they could further refine a useful definition of the concept of discrimination in the nuclear
context. First, one must look at the legitimate interests of the state
attacking. In this case the United States contended that by attacking
these two cities the war was shortened and the lives of many Americans and Japanese were saved. Additionally, some would argue that
as long as the primary objectives of the attack are military in nature,
widespread collateral damage will not deprive the use of force from
being considered properly discriminatory.65 Even if opponents of this
reading claim that the underlying facts of the Hiroshima-Nagasaki

62. MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 343.
63. Id. at 347; however it is important to note on this point that the United States specifically provided that in its ratification of the First Protocol was subject to the understanding that
“the rules established by this Protocol were not intended to have any effect on and do not regulate or prohibit the use of nuclear weapons.” Such reservations are permissible under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties as long as they do not conflict with the object and purpose of the treaty. In this case because of other areas governed by the treaty this would appear
to not be such a violation.
64. BURROUGHS, supra note 25, at 67.
65. FUJITA, supra note 46, at 35 (quoting ROBERT W. TUCKER, THE JUST WAR: A STUDY
OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN DOCTRINE, 90–93 (1960)).
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case are questionable,66 the underlying theory provides a powerful basis upon which discrimination can be understood to potentially allow
for the use of nuclear weapons in limited circumstances.
D. Application of the principles of international law to the use of
nuclear weapons
The International Court of Justice in 1996 provided an advisory
opinion at the behest of the World Health Organization (WHO) and
the United Nations General Assembly on the question, “[i]s the
threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance permitted under
international law?”67 While the court dismissed the WHO as not being a proper body to put a question of this type before the court, it did
proceed with the General Assembly request.68 While the court decided several questions individually. There are four that are important to the overall discussion about when, or if, the use of nuclear
weapons is ever permissible.
1. No Customary or Treaty Rule Allowing the Authorization of
Nuclear Weapons. The ICJ stressed that “[t]here is in neither
customary nor conventional international law any specific
69
authorization of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.” The court in
this case looked largely at the customary aspects regarding the
70
There are two
authorization of the use of nuclear weapons.
components necessary for a customary rule to take root: there must
be state practice and opinio juris (intent on the parts of the states to
support such as use).71
Three elements are necessary for state practice to constitute a
customary norm. There must be (1) sufficient state practice, (2) by a
72
specified number of states, (3) over a certain amount of time. The

66. BURROUGHS, supra note 25, at 67; MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 26.
67. Opinion on the Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5.
68. The power of the court to decide this case comes from Article 65(1) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice which states “the Court may give an advisory opinion on any
legal question at the request of whatever body may be authorized by or in accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations to make such a request.”
69. Opinion on the Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, at ¶ 105 .
70. While the Nonproliferation Treaty allowed for 5 states to retain nuclear weapons there
is no treaty law to support the use of such obligations.
71. See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States) (Merits),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27); for a further explanation of customary international law see
MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 39–48.
72. MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 41.
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calculus of whether there is sufficient state practice for a customary
norm requires balancing these elements. Regarding the use of nuclear weapons, it has been acknowledged that it is very difficult for a
rule of customary international law to be acknowledged from a single
73
instance of use. In the case of nuclear weapons, while the five major
superpowers all have such weapons, and they have tested these
weapons extensively, there is only one such instance of their use during war.74 While one could stretch this principle and claim that the
policy of developing these weapons is sufficient to allow their use,
looking at the lack of such actual use over such a long period of time
makes it equally difficult to claim that a customary rule allowing the
use of nuclear weapons exists.
The insufficient state practice that exists regarding the threat or
use of nuclear weapons is reinforced by the mixed message surrounding their possession by the nuclear powers. While the court took note
that deterrence was the central policy undergirding the previous fifty
years of nuclear policy, the court did not determine that such a policy
should influence the creation of a customary rule that would allow for
75
the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, the lack of intent behind any actions tied to the lack of state practice prevented a customary rule in
favor of allowing the use of nuclear weapons.76

73. Asylum Case, 1950 I.C.J 266, 277 (Nov. 20).
74. FUJITA, supra note 46.
75. Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, at ¶
105.
But see Judge Shi (Appended Declaration), available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunan_judgment_advisory%20opinion_19960708/iunan_ijudgment_a
dvisory%20opinion_19960708_Opinions/iunan_ijudgment_19960708_Declaration_Shi.htm (last
visited Jan. 3, 2005) (noting disagreement over the use of political deterrence as a basis for
opinio juris stating that this was international politics and should not be used in the determination of rules under international law).
76. This holding of the court was not controversial as it was unanimous.
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2. No Customary or Treaty Rule Against Nuclear Weapons.
There is in neither customary nor conventional international law any
comprehensive and universal prohibition on the threat or use of
nuclear weapons as such.77 A group of states argued before the court
that both treaties and customary law were sufficient to prohibit the
use of nuclear weapons in law, however, the court in the end
determined, by a sizable majority, that no such law existed.78
Under treaty obligations relating to other types of weapons, it is
argued that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is prohibited. Such
groups pointed to The Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva
Protocol of 1925 as either controlling in themselves or sufficient in
their extension to create a customary rule that prohibits the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons.79 The 1925 Geneva Protocol was
seen as most applicable.80 It was argued that the treaty’s prohibition
against the distribution by projectile of poisonous or other gases
should be seen as sufficiently analogous to the effects of nuclear
weapons to prohibit their use.81 The ICJ, however, chose not apply
these treaties, stating that under their plain meaning they could only
cover weapons whose actual effect was to poison or asphyxiate and
they were therefore inapplicable to nuclear weapons.82 The court,
through this narrow construction, refused to consider these treaties as
evidence of the prohibition of nuclear weapon use in customary international law.
Beyond these treaties, there is other evidence that opponents of
nuclear weapons were able to use to support creation of a rule against
the threat or use of nuclear weapons. First, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution in 1961 stating that the use of nu-

77. Id. at ¶ 105.
78. Id.
79. Roger S. Clark, Treaty and Custom, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 171, 173 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes &
Philippe Sands eds., 1999).
80. Id.
81. MOXLEY, supra note 12, at 197.
82. Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, at ¶ 54–
56. But see Dissenting Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, available at http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunan_judgment_advisory%20opinion_19960708/iunan_ijudgment_a
dvisory%20opinion_19960708_Opinions/iunan_ijudgment_19960708_Dissenting_Shahabuddeen
.htm (arguing strenuously for the applicable of the rules of these conventions because of the
fallout that results from nuclear weapons being tantamount to poisoning) (last visited June 19,
2004).
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clear weapons was illegal.83 General Assembly resolutions are not
binding, but they can be considered as evidence of customary interna84
tional law. However, in this case, the number of states that voted for
this resolution undermines its power as an ingredient of custom. Only
fifty-five states voted for the resolution while twenty states voted
against.85 In this circumstance, the circumstances of the support for
the resolution reduces its strength as illustrative of any international
custom, as the resolution was motivated by narrow strategic concerns
of the Soviet Union.86
Opponents of nuclear weapons additionally tried to point to the
lack of their use as evidence of a customary rule that such weapons
were not allowed. While the lack of an event can be evidence of state
action, in this case there was no opinio juris to support a belief that
states with nuclear weapons did not use them because they were illegal. The court specifically took notice, as touched upon in the previous section, of the importance that deterrence has played in the policy
of nuclear states, and how this policy was grounded in the use of nu87
clear weapons in a massive retaliation against any possible attack.
Additionally, under the principle of the North Sea Continental Shelf
case, the rationales of the nuclear powers would be essential in creating a customary rule against the use of nuclear weapons because they
were the states that such a rule would most directly be applied; those
states being in vocal opposition to the illegality of nuclear weapons
once again undermines the creation of a customary norm against the
88
proscription of nuclear weapons.
3. Limited Area for Debate. It follows from the requirements
discussed above that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would
generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in
83. Declaration on the Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-Nuclear Weapons,
G.A. Res. 1653, U.N. GAOR, 16th Sess. (1961).
84. MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 379.
85. Id. at 346.
86. Id. This is because the main defensive line against the Soviets was highly dependent
upon the nuclear deterrent that existed in Western Europe.
87. See supra notes 7–17 and accompanying text regarding the policy of deterrence; see also
Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5. But see Judge
Shi
Declaration,
available
at
http://www.icjcij.org/icjwww/icases/iunan/iunan_judgment_advisory%
20opinion_19960708/iunan_ijudgment_advisory%20opinion_19960708_Opinions/iunan_ijudgme
nt_19960708_Declaration_Shi.htm (believing that deterrence was a political question not subject
to consideration by the court) (last visited June 20, 2004).
88. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 20).
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armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of
humanitarian law, however, in view of the current state of
international law, and of the elements of fact at its disposal, the Court
did not conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear
weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of
self-defense, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake.89
In the most controversial aspect of its decision, the court stated
that humanitarian law prohibited nuclear weapons use except in the
90
case where the viability of the state was in jeopardy. Yet the court
makes this broad assertion but does not provide guidance as to what
“survival of the state” means. The exception provides much difficulty
in that if this means that states have a fundamental right to preservation, a broad reading would create an exception that would gut the
norm stated in the first half of the holding.91 Additionally, under this
broad reading, this fundamental right would potentially trump a
state’s other obligations including any treaty limiting nuclear weapons.92 This would, in essence, create an exception from international
law when the state’s existence is threatened and would result in a default to deterrence being the guiding force in international law because the only thing that would keep states from killing their enemy
would be the fear of one’s own certain demise.93
However, a more limited reading of when a state can use nuclear
weapons may be more appropriate in light of the surrounding language used by the ICJ. In laying out the principles of necessity and
proportionality, the court was likely presenting an example of a limited case where a state may be able to meet the requirements laid out
under humanitarian law rather than a right that would inure to the
state. This reading is more palatable since there is no precedent
where an unlimited right of a state to its own preservation can be
found in treaty or customary law.94 However, a right to some form of
self-defense in the use of nuclear weapons and the lack of a clear
definition of such a right represents the lack of certainty in this field

89. Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, at ¶
105.
90. Id.
91. Marcello G. Kohen, The Notion of ‘State Survival’ in International Law, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
293, 294–95 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 298.
94. Id. at 306–10.
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of international law as principles of the nuclear age are stretched to
cover the realities of modern warfare.
4. Need for Negotiations. There exists an obligation to pursue
in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear
disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international
95
control. The ICJ concluded their decision by reminding states of the
obligation to continue with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.
This holding of the court was designed to counter one of the main
criticisms of bringing this case to the ICJ in the first place—a decision
about the legality of the use of nuclear weapons would impede
progress on treaty negotiations for nuclear disarmament.96 This can
be read as an attempt to cajole the nuclear states to bring to fruition
the end goal of nuclear disarmament, and that their right to maintain
a stockpile of nuclear weapons is limited, based on their good faith
efforts to eliminate them.97
The court’s decision came down to the conclusion that nuclear
weapons should seldom, if ever, be used and suggests that all states
have an obligation to work together toward true nuclear disarmament. The decision marks a concerted effort to lay out with authority
the position of international law on nuclear weapons; however, as is
evident from this analysis, notable and evident gaps exist in international law when humanitarian law provides the underlying principles
for such principles. This gap can be attributed to how humanitarian
law has difficulty understanding how nuclear weapons operate within
their unique framework. Additionally, the lack of binding authority
behind the ICJ decision underscores the weakness of the international law and the nonproliferation principles the ICJ is asking all
states to follow. As a result, the ICJ decision, while arguably one of
the highest and most authoritative decisions on the status of nuclear
weapons under international law, remains an opinion.

95. Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 5, at ¶
105.
96. MEYROWITZ, supra note 39, at 197–208.
97. See Miguel Marin Bosch, The Non-Proliferation Treaty and Its Future, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
375, 386–89 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 1999) (arguing that nuclear weapons states are not serious about nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and that a new
paradigm is necessary to lead to true disarmament).
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E. The American Backlash to International Law—The Death of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
The frustration with soft international law and the lack of an effective mechanism for the enforcement of obligations has not gone
unnoticed in the world’s capitals. Several examples point to the
breakdown in nuclear weapons control regimes, a high profile example among them was the United States Senate’s refusal to ratify the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1999. While there are
several reasons (including ones that are purely political) for the
treaty’s demise, a shift in trust of international regimes on nuclear
98
weapons was one of the driving forces behind its defeat. There was
concern in the Senate of how the CTBT would operate. First, there
was deep suspicion over the science of high-tech virtual testing and its
ability to maintain the readiness of U.S. nuclear capabilities.99 Second, there was an overarching belief that other states that had signed
the CTBT would not actually stop nuclear testing and that the
CTBT’s monitoring and verification systems were insufficient to de100
Given these concerns, the CTBT not only failed to
tect cheating.
attain its required two-thirds majority but instead failed to achieve a
bare majority.101
The CTBT is more than simply illustrative of bad vote counting
by Democrats in what amounted to a game of chicken between internationalists and unilateralists. It represents a growing frustration with
soft law principles to bind parties that provide no means of ensuring
compliance by other members. The CTBT vote also provides a preview of the current Bush administration foreign policy characterized
by the flexing of American muscle to force compliance on a more bilateral level.102 The question that must then be asked is how well bilateral threats can provide an effective tool for nuclear weapons management.

98. Terry L. Deibel, The Death of a Treaty, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2002, at 142, 144–45
(providing an analysis on the reasons for the treaties defeat including a group of Senators who
believed that international law cannot bring true security for the United States).
99. Id. at 144.
100. Id. at 145.
101. Id. at 142.
102. Id. at 161; G. John Ikenberry, American’s Imperial Ambition, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct.
2002, at 45, 51.
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III. THE BUSH POLICY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS
If the United States intends to rely on its strength to govern nuclear weapons proliferation, it will have to shift from the current
framework of nonproliferation to a new regime that can provide stability but also provides some overarching basis that can bring to accord the hearts and minds of nuclear weapons states, those states not
seeking nuclear weapons, and those states without nuclear weapons
who may be seeking them.103
A. Nuclear Theory a la Carte
In December 2002 as a derivative of the new National Security
Strategy, the Bush administration released the National Strategy to
104
Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. The policy is heavily reliant
upon an amalgamation of many different theories under the umbrella
105
of a “new” concept of deterrence and counterproliferation.
The President’s plan is based largely on the opinion that new
states should not be allowed to develop nuclear weapons and the
United States should take measures to ensure such states comply with
current nonproliferation controls. The plan would take into account
the tools of diplomacy, arms control, multilateral agreements, export
controls, and other elements to enforce international agreements that
106
would limit the spread of nuclear weapons. The problem is that the
United States emphasizes obligations of other states under the NPT
107
The
but fails to account for its own obligations under the treaty.
Bush perspective is based on the assumption that nuclear weapons
are here to stay and that the United States should reduce its stockpile
only as is prudent, while developing new nuclear technologies (such
as the Trident) for today’s modern enemy.108 The policy also promotes the further development of nuclear missile defense technology,
which has been evidenced in the United States withdrawal from the
ABM treaty.109

103. George Perkovich, Bush’s Nuclear Revolution: A Regime Change in Nonproliferation,
FOREIGN AFF., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 1, available at http://www.drumbeat.mlaterz.net/OpEd/George%20Perkovich%20Bush’s%20Nuclear%20Revolution%20030203a.htm (last visited
June 20, 2004).
104. See supra note 6.
105. Id. at 1.
106. Id. at 2–3.
107. Perkovich, supra note 103, at 7.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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The Bush policy is based upon a fundamental shift in the understanding of the proper role of nuclear weapons and how they should
be governed. The weapons themselves are not seen as the problem—
the new focus is on the state and non-state actors who would seek to
use those weapons (terrorists; rogue states; and potentially Pakistan,
Russia, and China).110 Such a policy of allowing nuclear disarmament
to be on what can be described as an a la carte basis not governed by a
larger multilateral framework negates the benefit that non-nuclear
nations realize from their NPT obligations and neglects the fact that
there are states that may seek to join the nuclear club if such weapons
will remain attainable in the distant future.111
B. Preemptive Self-defense
Another element within the Bush strategy regarding WMD is the
concept of a preemptive attack to prevent other states from attaining
112
Such a right of preemptive attack is extremely
nuclear weapons.
controversial. A state is understood to have a right to use force to re113
pel an attack that is brought upon it. The imperative question here
is how imminent must an attack be before a state can use force
against that threat. The U.N. Charter provides no explicit guidance
on when force may be applied in such a situation. While opponents
argue that the language of Article 51 provides a mechanism to deal
with threats to states under the first clause of Article 51 and Article
2(4), a more liberal reading of the right of self-defense can be made
by looking at the applicable language of the Charter in conjunction
with the circumstances of its drafting.114
The historic Caroline Doctrine states that preemptive hostile action can only be used when an attack is “instant, overwhelming, leav115
The
ing no choice of means and no moment for deliberation.”
Caroline Doctrine, while a central concept in the use of force, should
be questioned in its applicability to the nuclear weapons context since
the Caroline was not touting a twenty-megaton nuclear weapon. Because of the large threat inherent in such a weapon, a hard Caroline
approach to nuclear weapons would force states to accept nuclear de110. Id. at 5–6.
111. SAUER, supra note 9, at 31.
112. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra note 6, at 3.
113. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
114. MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 312.
115. Michael Elliott, Strike First, Explain Yourself Later, TIME, June 24, 2002, available at
http://www.time.com/time/columnist/printout/0,8816,265536,00.html (last visited June 16, 2004).
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velopment and would only allow action when the weapon was primed
for attack. The concept of necessity and immediacy in preventing an
attack needs to be balanced with the amount of damage that will result from a state acquiring nuclear weapons and the inability to properly respond to a threat after a nuclear weapon’s development and
deployment. The statement by Vattel about the possibility of preemptive self-defense should be looked at as a better articulation of
the proper norm.116 When looking at what actions are permissible for
a state to provide for its own security, Vattel opined that:
It is safest to prevent the evil when it can be prevented. A nation
has a right to resist an injurious attempt, and to make use of force
and every honourable expedient against whosoever is actually engaged in opposition to her, and even to anticipate his machinations,
observing, however, not to attack him upon vague and uncertain
suspicions, lest she should incur the imputation of becoming herself
117
an unjust aggressor.

This statement seems to correctly emphasize the harm component
while properly requiring that a harm demonstrably exist before any
such force could be used. While this admittedly obfuscates the third
step under the Caroline Doctrine, the legal requirement of exhaustion
of deliberation has become less important and harder to apply when
the goal is to prevent the development of nuclear weapons.118
Preemptive self-defense does have its drawbacks and enjoys little
historical support. Until recently, it has been frowned upon by all
major powers, including the United States. The most notable example of its disfavor was Israel’s bombing of the Osirak nuclear facility,
which Israel claimed was going to be used to produce a nuclear
119
The United Nations Security Council stated that the acweapon.

116. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, bk II, ch. IV, § 50 (Joseph Chitty trans.,
1870), available at http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel_02.htm (last modified Oct. 21, 2002)
(last visited June 16, 2004).
117. Id.
118. See Thomas Graham, Jr., National Self-Defense, International Law, and Weapons of
Mass Destruction, 4 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 1, 7–8 (2003) (noting that the condition of immediacy has
been diminished when looking to threats that are less predictable and by state action); Angus
Martyn, The Right of Self-Defense Under International law-The Response to Terrorist Attacks of
11 September, available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/2001-02/02cib08.htm (Feb.
12, 2002) (last visited June 16, 2004). But see Kelly J. Malone, Comment, Preemptive Strikes and
the Korean Nuclear Crisis: Legal and Political Limitations on the Use of Force, 12 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 807, 831–32 (2003) (noting that while exhaustion of peaceful remedies is not cited as
much as other aspects of the Caroline Doctrine it is an important concept of international law
reinforced by the U.N. Charter, and thereby applies it to the current North Korean Nuclear
Crisis).
119. MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 313.
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tions of Israel were unjustified in the face of the threat that existed at
120
that time. Beyond Osirak, there are situations where nuclear weapons were placed in Europe by the United States and in Cuba by the
Soviet Union; in both of these situations neither party used preemptive self-defense to stop the actions of the opposing party.121 The
question that cannot be answered and likely one of the main reasons
the principle has not been applied until recently is the fear that it will
be impossible to draw the line between when action would be justified and when it would be unjustified because it involves predicting
future actions of other states, and this could introduce chaos into international law and politics regarding the use of force.122 The bright
line rule of keeping “bad” weapons out of the hands of “bad” people
will not likely work in reality, as the nuclear club continues to grow.
However, as discussed below, there are ways to distinguish between
nuclear proliferators and one must do so in order to use this new doctrine of preemptive self-defense in a more practical setting.
Regardless of what one thinks of the doctrine of preemptive selfdefense as a tool to ward off the threat of nations developing weapons
of mass destruction, the doctrine appears to be here to stay, at least
for the immediate future. The attack on Iraq was largely based upon
the belief that Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction development programs needed to be stopped, as well as the claim that Hussein’s regime was in breech of Iraq’s obligations not to develop such
weapons.123 While the White House relied upon U.N. Security Council resolutions 687 and 1441 as additional support for the invasion of
Iraq, the entire context of these arguments was wrapped in the doctrine of preemptive self-defense.124 The doctrine, while under ques125
tion because of the inability to find WMD in Iraq, likely represents
a strategic realignment where the United States critically looks to its
own interests as justifying its action around the world.

120. S.C. Res. 487, U.N. SCOR, 22 Sess., 2288th mtg. at 10 (1981).
121. MALANCZUK, supra note 7, at 312.
122. Perkovich, supra note 103, at 8.
123. George W. Bush, President’s Radio Address, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/03/20030315.html (Mar. 15, 2003) (last visited June 16, 2004).
124. George W. Bush, President Says Saddam Hussein Must Leave Iraq in 48 Hours, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html (Mar. 17, 2003) (last
visited June 16, 2004).
125. Richard W. Stevenson, Head of Iraqi Arms Search May be Ready to Step Down, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2003, at A15; see discussion infra note 205.
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IV. THE PRAGMATISM OF NUCLEAR
PREEMPTION AS APPLIED
Applying the doctrine of preemptive self-defense in theory is one
thing, however, one must look critically at the places where such a
doctrine would actually be used. A number of authors, for and
against preemptive action, have given lists of factors that should be
considered as the sole basis of when nuclear preemption is permissible. From these different analyses and having hindsight perspective
to consider what factors have actually affected preemption, this note
proposes four factors that should be used to judge the wisdom of using preemption in any given situation. The factors by which preemption seems to turn are: (1) the imminence of the development of nu126
clear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction; (2) the threat
127
a state perceives from outside its borders; (3) the ideological reason

126. This factor is a triggering mechanism, which the doctrine of preemptive self-defense is
based. Until a state has started some form of plans of weapons development, preemption is not
applicable. United States action in Iraq (discussed infra beginning with note 202 and accompanying text) turns largely how far out this issue can go. This element turns entirely on a temporal
question of when states will develop nuclear weapons technology and leaves reasons for development for a different analysis. Michael J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Self-defense, Inherence,
and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539,
552–53 (2002). However, it should be noted that the imminence factor by some has said to be a
two-sided determination, which allows preemption only up to the point where preemption is
likely to cause large damage (whether from the use of the weapon or environmental damage
from collateral radiation cause by the destruction of a facility). David Sloss, Forcible Arms
Control: Preemptive Attacks on Nuclear Facilities, 4 CHI J. OF INT’L L. 39, 48–49 (2003) (arguing
that North Korea has gone beyond the point where preemption is an option because of their
state of development).
127. This factor looks at what external threats possibly exist that cause a state to develop
nuclear weapons. This factor looks more at reasons for reactive development and use of nuclear
weapons, which will more likely be done by states that have a negative outlook on their position
and future in the overall global framework. VICTOR D. CHA & DAVID C. KANG, supra note 1.
Victor Cha provides a graph that helps understand how a states perspective on the world affects
its actions:
How do states Frame the Status Quo?
Domain of
Domain of Gains
Neutral
Losses
Preemptive of Preventative
Situation with Offense Having
Unlikely
Likely
Very High
the Advantage
Preemptive or Preventative
Very Unlikely
Unlikely
High
Situation with Defense Having
the Advantage
Id. at 27. As will be discussed with each state, the perspective a state has of its future will affect
whether a threat of preemptive attack will be effective in stopping weapons proliferation.
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for nuclear development;128 and (4) the state’s existing capacity to in129
flict destruction without weapons or mass destruction. One could
argue that the prudence of using the doctrine of preemptive selfdefense could be varied by each situation; in order to understand the
implications of this argument, these factors need to be applied to the
states against which this doctrine would be applied.
A. North Korea: Promises Broken (And a Nuclear Threat on the
Horizon?)
North Korea has been a complex adversary for United States
foreign policy for the second half of the twentieth century.130 While
the history of the United States-North Korea relationship relating to
nuclear proliferation could be (and has actually become many times
over131) a book in itself, its complexity can be (and must be for the
purposes of this note) quickly summarized. In 1994, the United
States (under a special envoy lead by former President Jimmy Carter)
entered into an agreement by which the United States agreed to provide benefits including a light water nuclear power plant to provide
power for the North as well as certain security guarantees. North Korea pledged to rejoin the NPT and allow inspections by the Interna-

128. At the basis of international law is the belief that state actors are rational and have reasons for their actions. However, certain reasons for developing weapons are defensive and
some are offensive in nature, differ in how strongly they are felt, and vary in how malleable they
are to outside pressure. “Rational state actors” and fundamentalists will react very differently
when threatened with the use of force. Louis Re e Beres, Israel, Iran, and Nuclear War: A Jurisprudential Assessment, 1 UCLA J. OF INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 65, 73–76 (1996).
129. Pragmatically for preemptive self-defense to be an option, it has to have some beneficial effect in bringing stability to regional and world politics. Thomas Graham, Jr., National
Self-Defense, International Law, and Weapons of Mass Destruction, 4 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 1, 8–9
(2003); CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 55. A state’s conventional forces and weapons need to
be considered when any preemptive attack is considered because a preemptive attack can bring
on a debilitating conventional weapons attack that will have similar evils to those sought to be
stopped by the use of preemption. See id.; see also discussion infra. Cf. Beres, supra note 128
(discussing the concept that “bee sting” attacks where one’s attack on an opponent brings one’s
own demise are often ill-advised).
130. See, e.g., William M. Drennan, Nuclear Weapons and North Korea: Who’s Coercing
Whom?, in THE UNITED STATES AND COERCIVE DIPLOMACY 157, 198 (Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin eds., 2003) (proving a full history of United States and North Korean interaction
and noting several times that relations have broken down between the states in 1994 and several
times since then).
131. See, e.g., CHA & KANG supra note 1; JOHN FEFFER, NORTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA: U.
S. POLICY AT A TIME OF CRISIS (2003). There are numerous books coming out as this conflict
changes.
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tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To this point, neither party
132
has fully complied with its obligations (the Agreed Framework).
In October 2002, the current North Korean crisis began when the
North Korean government admitted to the United States it had continued to develop nuclear weapons in violation of the Agreed
133
Framework and the NPT. While suspicions of the violations dated
back to 1997, few expected that North Korea would fully admit the
existence of the program when confronted.
The United States demanded that North Korea comply with existing nonproliferation agreement obligations before any further talks
could take place and suspended any deliveries of heating oil under
the terms of the Agreed Framework. The Koreans in response removed seals from their facilities and expelled IAEA inspectors, re134
moved IAEA monitoring equipment, and withdrew from the NPT.
Many believe that preemptive use of force against North Korea
is a non-issue, however, as talks with the North Koreans on proliferation issues have been unproductive and with North Korea appearing
to continue its program of weapons development, the question of
preemption has not been lightly dismissed. As Donald Rumsfeld
noted, “[w]e’re capable of winning decisively in one [Iraq] and swiftly
defeating in the case of [North Korea]. . . .”135 What must be answered is whether such a policy of threatening preemptive use of
force or actual preemption is an effective remedy to the North’s actions or whether such a policy will actually degrade the strategic situation further.

132. CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 137; Drennan, supra note 130, at 175—77.
133. CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 130–32. Leading up to this meeting with North Korea in
October relations between the United States and the North Korea had been improving. Highlevel meetings had taken place between Secretary Powell and North Korean foreign minister
Paik Nam-sen, construction at the United States funded light water reactor reached a new stage.
Id. Japan and North Korea had also reached a new level of improved relations as Japan apologized for its actions during World War II and Korea admitted and apologized for kidnapping
Japanese nationals for espionage training and arranged for visits with their families in Japan.
Id. at 131.
134. Id. at 133. Other North Korean actions include resumption of missile tests, declaration
of their nuclear weapons status, and plutonium reprocessing. Id.
135. John Diamond & Dave Moniz, Gulf Buildup Limits Options on Korea, Officials Say,
USA TODAY, Feb. 4, 2003, at A8, (quoting Secretary Rumsfeld). But see Philip Zelikow, The
Transformation of National Security, NAT INT., Spring 2003, at 24 (noting that administration
officials tend to overplay the role of truth teller because of the license they tend to get for working for a “plain-spoken” president). However, one may contend that subsequent events may
have changed the Secretary’s assessment.
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1. The Imminence of Development. Of the states analyzed in
this note, few would doubt that North Korea either has or is close to
developing nuclear weapons. It has additionally been proven that
North Korea has developed the rocket technology to deliver such
weapons over a great distance and has become a large exporter of
ballistic missiles.136 North Korea has admitted that they have nuclear
weapons with sufficient component materials to make a several addi137
The scope of North Korea’s weapons
tional weapons each year.
programs has notably grown as a result of Pakistan’s alleged assistance of the North’s nuclear program in the form of centrifuge technology that can spin out uranium suitable for weapons.138 This is in
addition to the Yongbyon plutonium extraction facility that initiated
the current Korean crisis. Additionally, North Korea has advanced
means to test its weapons that impede the United States from being
able to determine whether the North actually has an operational
weapon.139 The fact that this program has been in development for
many years and goes back to the early 1980s is proof that North Korea has sufficient means to be considered an imminent nuclear power.
2. The Threat from Outside Force. The Bush administration
has been very sharp in the words it has used in dealing with North
140
Korea’s nuclear weapons disclosures. North Korea’s concern over
its inclusion in the Bush administration’s “Axis of Evil” is likely
dwarfed by its concern over its perceived weakness relative to its
136. David E. Sanger, North Korea’s Bomb: Untested but Ready, CIA Concludes, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, at A8 (noting development activity has continued in North Korea and that
when North Korea has a weapon it will not need to actually test the weapon to see to determine
if it would work in an attack). CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 33.
137. Over the course of two years year of working on this note, the evidence on whether
North Korea currently has developed nuclear weapons has been both suggesting an affirmative
and negative answer. This is because North Korea has been able to develop more clandestine
means by which they develop weapons and test them as well. David E. Sanger, U.S. Widens
View of Pakistan Link to Korean Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at A1 (providing the most
recent assessment that a weapon nuclear weapon could be produced in the next one to two
years, however, intelligence analysts stat that “it is a guess”). As this note went to print, North
Korea admitted they had nuclear weapons. Brooke & Sanger, supra note 1.
138. David E. Sanger, U.S. Widens View of Pakistan Link to Korean Arms, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2004, at A1.
139. Associated Press, CIA: N. Korea Doesn’t Need Nuclear Tests, Nov. 9, 2003, available at
http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/11/8/184723.shtml (last visited June 20, 2004).
140. Even before North Korea’s announcement Bush had let it be known his dislike of the
North Korean leader with his statement that “I loathe Kim Jong-il—I’ve got a visceral reaction
to this guy. . . .” George W. Bush, Interview with Bob Woodward (Aug. 2002), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/11/17/60minutes/main529657.shtml (last visited Jan. 3,
2005).
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southern neighbor and competitor. Exposing the North’s weaknesses
provides some understanding of why it acts differently than most
states when force is exerted on them. Like a gambler on a losing
streak, one who is losing will often act more desperate in what they
will try to do to change the losing status quo. One could argue that
this applies on the state level, as well, as a state that finds time on its
side and a bright future has an incentive to fall in line and modify its
actions to the status quo when challenged.141 North Korea is in desperate straits. While North Korea has proposed some programs to
move forward in economic development aimed at garnering outside
investment for its production and manufacturing capabilities, the development of transportation systems with Russia, and the creation of
the Rajin-Sonbong free trade zone,142 these have been sporadic advances in an overall losing war for stability. North Korea has never
enjoyed the economic success of its southern neighbor, but the collapse of its patronage from the Soviet Union combined with Chinese
ambivalence has caused the GNP of the North to slip from fifty percent of the South to ten percent.143 In the post–September 11 world,
North Korea has also found that U.S. priorities have shifted to Af144
Shifts of influence compounded by years of
ghanistan and Iraq.
failed crops and bad winters have created a domestic environment
lacking stability.145 One of the few areas where North Korea has the
edge is in conventional military forces of around 900,000 to 1.1 mil146
lion forces as opposed to around 600,000 in the South. However, a
large military has been a mixed blessing for North Korea as it has fur147
ther taxed the North’s resources. This only exacerbates the horrible
141. CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 28.
142. Id. at 33, 103–14.
143. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, North Korea (2003), available at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook (last visited Dec. 19, 2003).
144. CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 77.
145. Id.
146. CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 51; MICHAEL O’HANLON & MIKE MOCHIZUKI, CRISIS
ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA 64 (2003).
147. O’HANLON & MOCHIZUKI, supra note 146, at 65–66. Military spending as part of the
North Korean GDP compared to all other countries indicates that strain on its resources.
Twenty-five percent of North Korea’s GDP is spent on defense. Id. at 64. That is compared to
South Korea’s 3 percent of GDP and the United States’ 3.3 percent of GDP on defense. Id.
These numbers are even relatively high when one looks to the 2 percent of GDP commonly
spent on defense in Europe. ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER 25, 89 (2004) (looking at the role economic growth has on a country’s ability to continue spending relatively large
amounts of money on defense in a robust economy). However, North Korea is exactly the opposite because relatively small amounts of money are spent on defense, but because of the its
depressed economy defense spending amounts to 25 percent of GDP.
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condition in the North as humanitarian aid is diverted to keep the
148
North Korea is clearly in a “loss” permilitary fed and supplied.
spective, thereby making it more likely to react negatively to coercive
force threatened against it; North Korea will have an incentive to lash
out when challenged because it has no stake in the current status
quo,149 suggesting the doctrine of preemptive self-defense may be disfavored in this context.
3. The Ideological Reason for Nuclear Development. North
Korea arguably has an incentive to develop nuclear weapons because
of its loss-oriented perspective, described above. In a broader sense,
one has to look at how, when, and under which circumstances North
Korea may actually use such weapons. Most obvious to note is the
fact that the Korean War has never officially ended, and the North’s
stated goal of the destruction of the South has never been renounced.
The North’s “theology” includes: (1) the North is the true representative of the Korean people and the puppet regime in the South is a
threat to the Korean people, (2) the people of the South would welcome unity with the North but for the United States’ aggression and
their puppet government, and (3) the North position is the morally
correct one and will ultimately win on the peninsula.150 It is quite
clear that the North is not working to force these issues, as it is hard
to work for the fall of South Korea when one is trying to stave off
one’s own collapse.151 However, North Korean actions likely will no
longer follow the line of Kim Il-Sung’s pragmatic policy that “[w]e
[the North] must wait and see what changes will bring about in the
revolutionary situation in South Korea” as those in the leadership
who remain loyal to revolutionary foundations as embodied in Kim
Jong-Il.152 This fear is also emphasized with the erratic nature of Kim
Jong-Il who remains unpredictable.
4. The Conventional Capacity. More than any other state analyzed here, North Korea has the best capacity to retaliate to a preemptive use of force with existing conventional weaponry in a manner
148. CHA & KANG, supra note 1, at 50–51.
149. Id. at 29.
150. Id. at 82–83.
151. Id. at 83–84. This pragmatic basis of action has a long history in North Korea as far as
making some form of rapprochement with the South. The Joint Communiqué between the
North and South has been cited as built upon Northern hopes of alienating the United States
and Japan.
152. Id. at 30.
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to devastate its opponents. General military estimates of a war on the
Korean peninsula would include 50,000 U.S. casualties, 500,000 Republic of Korea military casualties, untold civilian casualties, potential
devastation in the Asian economy and the possible destruction of
153
Seoul—all within the first three months. North Korea maintains a
sufficient conventional arsenal to destroy much of the industrialized
South, and when destruction of this level can be unleashed in retaliation for an initial attack, raising doubts about the efficacy of the doctrine of anticipatory self-defense as applied on the Korean Peninsula.154
Conclusion: Preemptive self-defense is not the correct paradigm
for dealing with North Korea. Any efforts to constrain North Korea’s
actions regarding the development or threatened use of a nuclear arsenal should rely on other tools as North Korea’s worldview, ability to
respond conventionally with a credible and effective military strike
and unpredictable leadership suggest that any such strike in self155
defense would cause greater instability.
B. Iran: the Danger of a Bipolar State
Iran and the United States have what can be best termed as a
“difficult relationship.” The Islamic Republic of Iran, as set up in
1979, has been known to support terrorism and Hezbollah with the
156
It has also suppurpose as furthering the “Islamic Revolution.”
ported external terrorist groups like Hamas in attacks in Israel.157 Alternatively, Iran has been a society of change, as the Iran of Ayatollah
Khomeini has become a much more multipolar state since his death
153. Drennan, supra note 130, at 191; O’HANLON & MOCHIZUKI, supra note 146, at 81 (noting that even under a slightly more optimistic prediction of the ability to defend the South, it
would still be bloody).
154. O’HANLON & MOCHIZUKI, supra note 146, at 81–82.
155. While some authors appear to consider preemption with North Korea to be a possible
last option that is available, what is possibly workable theory is impractical in practice. Cf. id.
(holding that preemption would run the risk of a larger war and should be a near last alternative). With the discovery in late 2003 that North Korea has clandestine centrifuge development
facilities, even if the U.S. would want to preempt North Korea they would be limited by their
ability to actually target the facility. Unlike Yongbyon or Osirak, which were easily targeted
reactor facilities, centrifuges can be hidden and makes preemption by means short of invasion
even more difficult. David E. Sanger, U.S. Widens View of Pakistan Link to Korean Arms, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at A1.
156. Beres, supra note 128, at 72–74. The terrorist actions of Iran are far too numerous and
are a tangential issue to the larger issue of WMD proliferation.
157. Id.

FINAL KLEIN.DOC

2004]

LAW AND POLITICS GOVERNING WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

3/8/2005 9:45 AM

421

in 1989, and different groups in Iranian society and the government
158
have different visions of the future of the Islamic revolution. Firmly
in charge of the military and most aspects of the government, including the military and police, is Khomeini’s successor, Ayatollah Ali
Hoseini-Khamenei.159 On the other side is the moderate president
Mohammad Khatami, who was reelected in a landslide in 2001 with
nearly eighty percent of the vote. While Khatami’s control is small
and relatively checked by the Ayatollahs, he has been able to grow in
stature as the face of the moderate movement in Iran.160 This movement of moderation suffered a large setback recently when parliamentary elections in Iran moved hard liners into a much more commanding control of the government.161 Within this complex state,
nuclear weapons development appears to remain a troubling issue as
an Iran with nuclear weapons would be perceived by many as a danger to stability in the region.
1. The Imminence of Development. There are several different
components of the Iranian weapons programs. The main source of
Iranian weapons in recent years has been Pakistan, China, North Korea, and Russia. It is well known that Iranian rocketry currently al162
Iran has
lows for the delivery of payloads over 1,500 kilometers.
worked to develop (first with Russian aid and later with North Korean aid) longer-range weapons to give it a range of at least 1,300
kilometers with the possibility of up to 4,000 kilometers.163 It is thus
158. Judith S. Yaphe, U.S.-Iran Relations: Normalization in the Future?, STRATEGIC FORUM
No. 188 (Jan. 2002), available at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF188/sf188.htm (last visited
June 19, 2004).
159. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Iran (2003), available at
http://www.odci/cia/publications/factbook (last visited Dec. 19, 2003); Reuel Marc Gerecht, Iran:
Fundamentalism and Reform, in PRESENT DANGERS: CRISIS AND OPPORTUNITY IN AMERICAN
FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY 111 (Robert Kagan & William Kristol eds., 2000) (providing a
discussion of the different personalities and roles in Iran).
160. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, IRAN’S MILITARY FORCES IN TRANSITION: A
CONVENTIONAL THREAT AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 10–11 (1999) (noting the
political jockeying that has been taking place since Khatami’s election including arrests of a
number of officials that supported Khatami but additionally noting that Khatami has been able
to get officials in office that support his moderate platforms).
161. Douglas Jehl, C.I.A. Says Elections in Iran Dealt Blow to Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,
2004, at A10.
162. CORDESMAN, supra note 160, at 66, 228.
163. Id. at 228 (there are a number of reports based on Israeli intelligence of missile programs in Israel). Actual weapons development shows that a test in July 21, 1998 that a missile
that was hoped to have a range of 1,240 kilometers exploded after going 620 miles; however, it is
claimed that Iranian rocketry is fairly accurate. Id. at 229. It is hoped that this rocket will give a
range of 1,300 kilometers. Iranian Missile a Regional Issue, Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
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evident that Iran likely has sufficient delivery mechanisms to threaten
much of the Middle East including Israel.
Nuclear weapons development in Iran has been in progress for
decades. With the help of Russia and China, Iran has developed nu164
clear reactors and has an acknowledged nuclear energy program. In
early 2003, the IAEA discovered that Iran had sufficient infrastructure that would allow it to have workable nuclear weapons by the end
of the decade.165 The Iranian program at Natatz involved an underground uranium enrichment facility equipped with centrifuges that
166
This process will allow
could produce weapons grade plutonium.
for the production of two weapons per year when fully operational.167
Thus it appears that Iran should be considered to be a state with
prospects for nuclear weapons in the near future.
2. The Threat from Outside Forces. The United States has a
long history of involvement in Iranian affairs whether it was the overthrow of Mohammad Mosaddeq’s government in favor of the Shah in
the early 1950s, the lack of support after being attacked by Iraq in the
early 1980s, or being spurned for its actions in moving forces into
168
neighboring countries during the Persian Gulf War. Saddam Hussein’s Iraq was a danger to Iran, and his propensity to develop nuclear
weapons was a substantial threat after he had shown that he was willing to use chemical weapons on his neighbor in his invasion of Iran
during the Iran-Iraq War.169 The threat from Iraq definitely changed
after Iraq’s defeat during the Persian Gulf War; however, two modern
threats drive the Iranian weapons program. Israel’s presence in the

tional Peace, at http://www.ceip.org/files/nonprolif/templates/article.asp?NewsID=96 (July 24,
2000) (last visited June 20, 2004). Most notably, the distance between Israel and Iran is 1,300
kilometers. Id.
164. CORDESMAN, supra note 160, at 66.
165. Johanna McGeary et al., What Will Make Them Stop?: Carrots? Stocks? Inside Bush’s
Diplomatic Struggle to Persuade Iran and North Korea to Give Up Their Nuke Programs, TIME,
Nov. 3, 2003, at 36. Israel claims that the development that Iran will have sufficient plutonium
in two years to have a nuclear weapon. Id.
166. Id.; Craig S. Smith, U.S. Softens Its Rebuke on Iran Nuclear Issue, Appeasing Allies,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004, at A5 (noting the recent concern over advanced designs for uranium
enriching centrifuges that Iran failed to declared under an agreement reached in November
2003 with the IAEA and traces of highly enriched uranium that has been discovered on some of
the equipment in Iraq).
167. McGeary et al., supra note 165.
168. Gerecht, supra note 159, at 128.
169. CORDESMAN, supra note 160, at 337.
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region is perceived by Iran as a threat to their existence,170 and Israel’s
possession of WMD is viewed as a danger to all Islamic states in the
171
region. Second, Iran’s strategic position between Russia, Iraq, and
the Taliban has contributed to its longstanding security concerns,
concerns which have been exacerbated by the perceived omnipresent
power of the United States.172 This situation was made worse due to
United States military initiatives over the last three years, in which
the United States now effectively surrounds Iran—Afghanistan is under the control of the American-backed Karzai government;173 while
Iraq is led by an American-backed and financed government. Thus,
Iran feels threatened on many levels, which make the development of
weapons of mass destruction an attractive path.
However, when juxtaposed against the situation proposed in
North Korea, Iranian concerns driving WMD development appear
now to be rather defensive in nature rather than part of a larger plot
for regional domination. Iran has large oil reserves that if allowed to
fully participate on the global level would stand to reap substantial
174
economic benefits. Economically and politically, Iran has been in a
state of flux but has remained stable as a state engaging in a fairly
productive dialogue between moderates and conservatives. Under
the threat perception matrix presented above, Iran likely views its future as at least neutral and is likely to have several opportunities for
growth in the future.
3. The Ideological Reason for Nuclear Development. Iran is an
ideological state. From one perspective, this defines all Iranian ac175
Traditionally, the Islamic government repressed those who
tion.
taught religious tolerance and has pledged the destruction of the Is176
These were the principles that undergirded Ayatollah
raeli state.
170. Israel is perceived as much as a threat for ideological reasons than as for any pragmatic
reasons. This will be discussed in the next section.
171. See generally Beres, supra note 128 (discussing the angst between Iran and Israel and
noting that Israel may need to attack Iran if Iran continues development of weapons that could
threaten Israel).
172. Gerecht, supra note 159, at 123–24.
173. See Amy Waldman & Carlotta Gall, A Young Afghan Dares to Mention the Unmentionable, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at A3 (discussing the ongoing development of the new government in Afghanistan and the problems with various warlords).
174. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Iran (2003), available at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook (last visited June 16, 2004).
175. See generally Beres, supra note 128 (viewing Iran as likely to attack regardless of its
chances of victory in a war because of ideological reasons).
176. Id.
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Khomeini’s revolution, and there is concern that external forces and
177
practical limitations of power will not limit Iranian proliferation.
However, weapons development appears to be largely, if not entirely, driven by pragmatic concerns about the region rather than
revolutionary ambitions. Iran, as was noted in the previous section, is
largely driven by security concerns as it is surrounded by forces hostile to its existence on all sides. One additionally needs to look at
military expenditures in Iran to see a practical reason weapons proliferation is appealing when surrounded by opposing forces. Military
spending has been relatively small part of the Iranian GNP since the
end of the Iran-Iraq war where it peaked at slightly more than 10 percent of GNP and has since dropped to being only about 3 percent of
178
GNP. This large drop in overall expenditures shows that military
spending is not as large of a drain relative to other countries widely
perceived as threats to the stability of the international system. Much
of the military focus of the Islamic Republic of Iran has been inward,
aimed at ensuring the republic is not undermined by Iranians rather
than by actions from the outside. Because of this, we see a situation
exactly the opposite of North Korea that is seeking nuclear weapons
at least partially to allow it to cut back on its military spending. Iran’s
proliferation is likely driven by an attempt for long term cost savings
as WMD (particularly nuclear weapons) would serve to create a cost
effective deterrent as opposed to an expensive conventional force.
This pragmatic concern is more typical for proliferating states where
nuclear weapons are seen as an easy fix to credible deterrence.
Threats of preemptive self-defense can be effective in tempering the
tendency to follow the easy path of nuclear proliferation.
4. The Conventional Capacity. As was alluded to above, while
Iran does have some military capacity, it is not such where it could
threaten its neighbors effectively with current weapons technologies.
Iran has a standing army of roughly 518,000, reserves of 350,000, 1,394

177. However, in rationalizing backing off nuclear proliferation, Iran cited ideological reasons for choosing to give up the weapons program. Ayatollah Khamenei stated nuclear weapons were an un-Islamic weapon. See generally Beres, supra note 128. This perspective of general ideological reasons for not developing weapons needs to be considered when one thinks
that Iran will necessarily act for ideological reasons.
178. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Iran (2003), available at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook (last visited June 16, 2004); CORDESMAN, supra
note 160, at 47.
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tanks, 297 combat aircraft, 4 combat ships, and 3 submarines.179 Iran
has been more effective in the development and purchase of mis180
siles; however, while one should not underestimate the Iranian military, it is not sufficient in either size or tactical reach to counter a pre181
Thus, Iran’s
emptive attack that would inflict major damage.
current military forces are not developed in such a way to make a
preemptive attack unpractical in the event that it was discovered that
Iran was going to develop nuclear weapons and preemption was the
chosen solution.
Conclusion: Iran is a state that would likely be susceptible to a
threat of preemption, given its relatively small conventional force, its
long-term economic prospects, and its strategic concerns.
C. Libya: surprises in admissions—questions in reasons
On December 19, 2003, a surprise announcement came from the
White House that Libya was seeking to join the international community again and was going to abandon its programs for weapons of
182
mass destruction. It is still questionable how far along the Libyan
weapons development had progressed or whether Qaddafi was just
giving up on a program that did not have any hope of actually producing a weapon.183 However, in the announcement of the agreement
with Libya, President Bush opined that the actions of the United
States and its coalition in opposition to WMD (likely referring to the
preemptive use of force in Iraq) was a major factor considered by
184
Qaddafi in his decision to abandon his pursuit of nuclear weapons.
However, in order to see if Libya is a country that fits the United

179. CORDESMAN, supra note 160, at 66–94. Interesting to note the practical problems Iran
faces as a result of changing sources of military hardware. Changing from Western, to Russian,
and then to North Korean technology has caused a hodgepodge of different technologies that
do not interpolate with each other. This has caused problems for maintaining a coherent single
military. Id.
180. Id. Iran has developed some moderate strike rocketry and has purchased a number of
scud missiles from North Korea.
181. One should note that Iran does has a sufficient supply of chemical and biological weapons that it could use in retaliation for an attack. Id.
182. George W. Bush, Libya Pledges to Dismantle WMD Programs, at http://www.white
house.gov/news/release/2003/12/20031219-9.html (Dec. 19, 2003) (last visited June 16, 2004).
183. Neil MacFarquhar, Libya’s ‘Brother Leader’ Pulls Another Rabbit from His Hat, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at A30.
184. George W. Bush, supra note 182. The State Department also stated that Qaddafi felt
the urgency to get rid of its weapons programs because of the American stances on Iran and
North Korea and the war in Iraq, and a fear from militant elements in his own country.
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States program of preemptive use of force, its profile needs to be applied to the preemption paradigm.
1. The Imminence of Development. In the past, Qaddafi’s
Libya was notorious for its proliferation intentions. Observers classified Libya as one of the most dangerous nations when it came to
185
WMD proliferation including nuclear weapons. The Russians provided a general reactor to Libya in the 1980s; however it was generally believed that the nuclear program had been abandoned or extremely small until recent disclosures.186 Libya also had a stockpile of
chemical weapons including World War I era mustard gas and addi187
On January 6, 2004,
tionally produced blister and nerve agents.
Libya signed the Chemical Weapons Convention and turned its
188
chemical weapons programs over to international inspectors.
In its disclosures regarding its weapons program, Libya was
shown to be more advanced in its programs than was initially
189
thought. Most significant in the discoveries about the Libyan program was their working centrifuges for nuclear enrichment. Such
190
centrifuges are necessary to make weapons-grade uranium. However, there were only a few centrifuges discovered and hundreds are
necessary to make the qualities of enriched uranium necessary over a
reasonable time.191 Additionally, the Libyans denied that any enriched uranium had been produced in those centrifuges.192 Regarding

185. Federation of American Scientists, WMD Around the World: Libya Special Weapons,
at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/libya/index.html (last visited June 20, 2004).
186. Id.
187. John J. Lumpkin, U.S.: Libya Eager to Dismantle Weapons, Associated Press (Dec. 19,
2003), available at http://www.emjournal.pwp.blueyonder.co.uk/a0053.html (last visited June 20,
2004).
188. Judith Miller, Libya Discloses Production of 23 Tons of Mustard Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
6, 2004, at A5; Samia Amin, Recent Developments in Libya, Carnegie Endowment for
International
Peace
at
http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/resources/Factsheets/developmentsinlibya.htm (Feb. 10,
2004) (last visited June 19, 2004).
189. Patrick Tyler & James Risen, Secret Diplomacy Won Libyan Pledge on Arms, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at A1 (showing the C.I.A. did have a some evidence regarding the Libyan
WMD programs but did not know the full extent of the programs development); Peter Grier,
From Iraq to Libya, U.S. Knew Little on Weapons, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Jan. 27,
2004, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2004/0127/p01s01-uspf/html (pointing to the lack of
accurate information the United States had regarding Libya’s weapons of mass destruction program).
190. Lumpkin, supra note 187.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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delivery systems for possible weapons, Libya admitted having Scud-C
ballistic missiles manufactured by North Korea that allow it to deliver
193
payloads over 300 miles. These contraband materials, missiles, and
supporting documents have been turned over to the United States.194
Thus, while Libya did not appear to have an advanced weapons program, it definitely had the potential and the intent to develop weapons and was further along than the international community had realized. Under a relaxed viewing of imminent development, Libya could
be so classified, however, it is more likely to classify Libya’s program
as having distant potential not close to that of Iran or North Korea
but, instead, more on the lines with what Iraq’s program was believed
to be.
2. The Threat from Outside Forces. Libya has long seen the
United States as a threat to its interests, however, the threat Libya
195
perceived was often an outgrowth of its own actions. More recently
Qaddafi has seen internal opposition grow to his thirty-year reign,
which has for the most part been unquestioned, as nearly twenty
years of economic sanctions have dealt a lasting economic blow to
196
Libyan stability. While a number of countries have lifted their sanctions against Libya after paying reparations for its terrorist actions,
the United States retained its sanctions until the recent disclosures.197
While Qaddafi has some concerns in opposition to his control,
and the fact that the Libyan economy has had a relatively hard, slow
transition to market level openness, there are several reasons that it
should view its future in either a gain oriented or neutral perspec-

193. Id. These missiles are sufficient to threaten United States interests in the Mediterranean region. NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Interim Report, NMD, and Implications for the
Alliance, at http://www.naa.be/archivedpub/comrep/2000/at-265-e.asp#6 (Nov. 2000) (last visited
June 19, 2004).
194. Amin, supra note 188. Overall 55,000 pounds of documents and components of Libya’s
nuclear and ballistic programs have been provided as part of Libya’s disarmament agreement.
Libya provided uranium hexaflouride, centrifuge parts, documentation, and guidance devices
for long-range missiles. Id.
195. Among the most notable actions was an air raid on a Qaddafi palace after it was
blamed for an explosion in a Berlin discotheque that killed an American serviceman. Libyan
supported terrorists additionally supported bombings of commercial airliners over Lockerbie,
Scotland and over Africa. MacFarquhar, supra note 183.
196. Id.; Tyler & Risen, supra note 189 (noting the fact that after decades of economic sanctions Libya is economically crippled and needs the return of the economic advantage from its
rich oil reserves).
197. Id.
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tive.198 Libya has oil reserves of nearly 30 billion barrels and further
exploitation of those resources would allow it to add to its current oil
199
production of 1.4 million barrels per day. This would allow Libya to
finance its market transformation and theoretically stabilize the Qaddafi government. For this reason alone, Libya, as can be deduced
from their actions in December 2003, is prone to act favorably when it
feels threatened by the even the remote possibility of a preemptive
attack.
3. The Ideological Reason for Nuclear Development. Libya is
not unlike Iran in theory. While a de facto military dictatorship,
many of its actions were based on Islamic principles. The “old” Libya
could be said to be a nation that acted entirely for ideological reasons,
blind of the repercussions of its action. Its support of worldwide terrorism drove its entire foreign policy. Qaddafi stated “I will do everything in my power to divide the world into imperialists and freedom
200
fighters.” However, old Libya is dead and from its ashes appears to
be a “new” pragmatic Libya. Qaddafi fears the loss of control that
befell his contemporary, Saddam Hussein, and Libya needs American
investment to shake off decades of economic sanctions.
4. The Conventional Capacity. Libya’s military ranks were
composed of an estimated 90,000 solders in the 1980s, but the size of
201
the Libyan military has continued to shrink. Its defense budget is
1.3 billion dollars, being slightly less than 4 percent of GDP.202 It has a
small air force of older Soviet aircraft, and a navy that is essentially
the equivalent of a coast guard that is composed of six Soviet-built
submarines. As discussed above, Libya did maintain a moderate
stockpile chemical weapons and moderate ballistic missile technology.203 While Libya does have a working military, it is not so sizable
to make preemption dangerous.

198. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Libya (2003), available at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook (last visited June 16, 2004).
199. Id.
200. Boaz Ganor, Survey of Arab Affairs- A Periodic Supplement to Jerusalem Letter/Viewpoints, available at http://www.ict.org.il/articles/article3.htm (June 1, 1992) (last visited
June 16, 2004).
201. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Libya (2003), available at
http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/factbook (last visited June 16, 2004).
202. Id.
203. Id.
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Conclusion: Libya is an example of the secondary effects that can
be expected of preemption doctrine where a state that does not have
fully developed weapons programs will potentially halt its programs
upon noticing the peril of further development.
D. Iraq—Reflections on Preemptive Force in Action
As was addressed in the previous section, the attack on Iraq was
largely built upon the belief that Iraq had to be stopped before they
204
could develop WMD to attack its neighbors. Iraq has provided a
harsh test for a new doctrine as evidence of actual WMD has been
virtually non-existent causing critics of the policy to say it is unworkable. While looking back at history benefits from hindsight,205 in this
section, the four-factor analysis will again be applied as to the appropriateness of using preemptive use of force to deal with the perceived
threat from Iraq with particular emphasis on the first point, imminence. Additionally, comparisons with the applications done with
other states above will be done to provide a useful juxtaposition to
when the doctrine should be applied.

204. George W. Bush, President’s Radio Address, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2003/03/20030315.html (Mar. 15, 2003) (last visited June 16, 2004).
205. It is beyond the scope of this article to delve into the larger issue of intelligence
breakdowns that have taken place in Iraq. Former U.N. weapons inspector David Kay noted in
his statements about intelligence gaffs in Iraq that “[o]btaining accurate reads on enemy
firepower is perhaps the most crucial challenge the nation is facing” and “[i]f the intelligence is
correct, policy-makers have a better shot of doing the right thing. If it isn’t, the resulting
policies are likely to be flawed.” George Gedda, Getting a Handle on Enemy Weapons is No
Small
Challenge,
ASSOCIATED
PRESS,
Feb.
26,
2004,
available
at
http://www.manilatimes.net/national/2004/feb/26/yehey/opinion/20040226opi7.html (last visited
June 20, 2004). Former executive director of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), Hans Blix, has been concerned about the incorrect
prediction of finding nuclear weapons in Iraq and provided some rationales of the mistake. See
HANS BLIX, DISARMING IRAQ 255–71 (2004). If preemption is going to be used in the future,
more resources will have to be dedicated to providing reliable intelligence on proliferation
programs in rogue states that are working to activity hide such programs. The practicalities of
discovering weapons programs along with providing the needed legitimacy for preemptive
action dictate that efforts on this front need to be redoubled. See Joseph Kahn, North Korean
Candor to be Central to New Nuclear Talks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2004 (noting Chinese
hesitance regarding the quality of U.S. intelligence with respect to secret North Korean
weapons programs), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/24/international/asia/24CNDKORE. html?pagewanted=1&ei=5070&en=e4ffed9eb8132ef1&ex=1087876800 (last visited June
20, 2004). But see Steven R. Weisman, Lasting Discord Clouds Talks on North Korean Nuclear
Arms, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004 (noting increased cooperation among the non-North Korean
parties as a result of North Korea’s flippant behavior at the February joint meeting), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/14/international/asia/14NORT.html?ex=1394600400&en=54e1
2324d09a8d9f&ei=5007 (last visited June 20, 2004).
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1. The Imminence of Development. Iraq had tried to develop
nuclear weapons in the past and had come relatively close to developing a nuclear weapon. While it was questionable whether Iraq was
developing nuclear weapons in early 2003, President Bush stated “in
one year or five years, the power of Iraq to inflict harm on all free nations would be multiplied many times over.”206 The essence of this argument was that it would be foolish for the United States to wait until
Iraq actually had nuclear weapons before it was ready to attack. Indeed, despite an apparent failure to produce conclusive proof of
weapons program, the United States invaded based largely on what it
believed was a secret nuclear, chemical and biological weapons program as well as a connection to Al Qaeda.207 After Saddam’s forces
were quickly defeated, the United States search for the WMD foot208
The Bush administration now works to
prints was unsuccessful.
stretch what would arguably be sufficient evidence to justify a preemptive attack from actual weapons to any general WMD weapons
program at any level of development209—essentially the rationale now
used is to focus on Saddam Hussein’s intent and desire to develop
WMD and not whether he actually had such weapons.210 However,
stretching the self-defense doctrine to claim that early planning of a
WMD program is sufficient to claim a right of preemptive selfdefense is likely an abuse of the doctrine and is unnecessary. One
must remember cases where states have started nuclear weapons programs, only to abandon them after a change of heart—the recent
Libya solution is instructive in that regard. The Iraq situation appears
fundamentally different than the current situation in Iran and North
Korea, where weapons programs have progressed further down the

206. George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on Iraq, Mar. 17, 2003, n.39 Weekly Comp.
Pres Doc 338, 340 (Mar. 24, 2003), available at http://www.cnsnews.com/ViewNation.asp
?Page=%5C%5CNation%5C%5Carchive%5C%5C200303%5C%5CNAT20030317g.html (last
visited June 19, 2004).
207. Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
599, 603 (2003).
208. Richard W. Stevenson, Head of Iraqi Arms Search May be Ready to Step Down, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 2003, at A15.
209. Id. President Bush has tried to recharacterize what was necessary for preemptive force
to be appropriate. In an interview when asked him if evidence would be found of actual weapons or only weapons programs, he answered “So, what’s the difference?” Id.
210. Stevenson, supra note 208. The United States does have evidence, as has been confirmed by Dr. Kay, that the Iraqis’ had programs to develop various WMD; however, Kay stated
that he would need as much as nine months before being able confirm or deny the existence of
actual weapons.
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road to development and the information regarding such development appears considerably more concrete.
2. The Threat from Outside Forces, the Ideological Reason for
Nuclear Development, and the Conventional Capacity. The basis of
the Iraqi weapons programs was likely a tool to provide Iraq a degree
of legitimacy and means of checking United States actions in and
around the Persian Gulf. Iraq serves an ideal example of a state seeking to exert clout in the region, however, the fact that Iraq did not actually possess WMD made its bargaining position weaker than what it
could have hoped with such weapons. Iraq also serves as the perfect
example of a totalitarian state that sees WMD as the magic potion to
counter perceived American aggression. Iraq had not been able to
use the airspace over a majority of its country for years because of nofly zones that had been set up and had been subject to regular attacks
by American forces patrolling the region. Iraq provides a lesson that
one proliferates at its own risk.
Conclusion: Iraq is an example of preemption pushed to its limit.
Preemptive action was likely unwarranted as Iraq’s alleged WMD
program had not been developed as extensively as initially thought.
Further, because Iraq’s military and infrastructure had been eroded
by a decade of low-level war and economic sanctions following the
Persian Gulf War, Iraq’s ability to produce a credible conventional
response to any U.S. preemptive aggression was not credible.
V. CONTEXTUALIZING THE INCONSISTENCY—
RETHINKING NONPROLIFERATION
The United States’ policy of preemptive self-defense has been
widely regarded as irresponsible and unnecessarily unilateral—with
detractors claiming it will ultimately lead to a much more dangerous,
unstable world.211 Yet the monster of preemptive self-defense can and
should be tamed, and integrated with the treaty obligations that cur212
rently exist under the NPT. As has been discussed in this note, the
NPT has provided a means of potentially eliminating the world of nuclear weapons by stemming the spread of weapons to states not currently part of the nuclear club.213 Yet, the NPT is not a panacea—

211. Madeline K. Albright, Bridges, Bombs, or Bluster?, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2003, at
2.
212. Perkovich, supra note 103, at 3.
213. See discussion supra notes 21–23.
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critics are justifiably concerned about a tool that in essence relies on
“good faith” and constrained by suspect enforcement mechanisms,
214
especially when the stakes are so high. Additionally, the willingness
to threaten preemptive self-defense has arguably proven to produce
positive results in Libya, along with potentially positive developments
in Iran. Yet amputating nuclear disarmament from international legal principles, as the Bush Doctrine would do, has the potential to
produce great confusion and effectively removes the long-term carrot
that existed behind NPT—the eventuality of a nuclear free world.215
A. Preemption Is a Legitimate Tool
The United States is the world’s sole superpower, and its power
must be realized as a reality in the current international climate. The
Bush administration should take this opportunity to strengthen multilateral nonproliferation by moving toward multilateral nuclear disarmament, however the United States should have the right to condition such disarmament upon other states doing the same.216 Under
such a system, a violation of obligations must amount to more than
short-term economic sanctions.
It is also questionable how far the United States is willing to push
the doctrine of preemptive self-defense to enforce nonproliferation
financial resources, political capital, and the pragmatic difficulties of
retaining networks of information will likely be stretched to their
limit.217 However, the United States has set a bold precedent in its

214. See discussion supra notes 96–99.
215. See discussion supra notes 21–23.
216. Philip Zelikow, supra note 135, at 25 (noting that “the administration prefers international institutions that judge performance and stress accountability rather than those that maintain a detached neutrality in order to preserve a friendly consensus”).
217. One need only consider the critique by many that are concerned over the focus on
WMD that has affected the United States’ ability to seek out al Qaeda as states in the Middle
East are concerned with the intentions of the United States. See Albright, supra note 211; Stephen Zunes, The Archipelago of “Evil”—Middle East, in POWER TRIP: U.S. UNILATERALISM
AND GLOBAL STRATEGY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 117, 129–36 (John Feffer ed., 2003) (stating
that United States multilateralism have caused several problem for the United States operations
in the Middle East). Indeed, it is difficult for the United States to focus simply on weapons proliferation when other foreign policy goals in combating terrorism as one if its main allies in that
war, Pakistan, has proven to be one of the prime suppliers of weapons technology to Iran, North
Korea and Libya. David E. Sanger, U.S. Widens View of Pakistan Link to Korean Arms, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 14, 2004, at A1 (noting the Bush Administration has not pushed Pakistan on the
proliferation because of the search for Osama bin Laden); Kamran Khan, Pakistanis Exploited
Nuclear Network, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 2004, at A1 (noting the extent to which Pakistan was
providing resources to Iran and Libya and that Pakistan’s leaders were not providing oversight
over its nuclear weapons programs).
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dealings with Iraq that can and should be employed credibly in its negotiations with Iran and North Korea. While this does not necessarily
mean threatening invasion, as doing so would not necessarily be effective (as is discussed above with North Korea) promoting an environment where one is punished for seeking to join the nuclear club
instead of getting the proverbial gift basket of security guarantees, oil
and food supplies is necessary if nonproliferation is to have any longterm chance of success.
B. Multilateralism is Not Inconsistent with Preemption
Multilateral relations cannot always be civilized—given the potential security benefits to states currently in pursuit of WMD, a willingness to use military action to enforce the stated purpose of NPT
regime is necessary. While other states may not approve of the use of
the preemptive attacks, Iran is an example of the threat of such action
providing a “good cop-bad cop” dynamic where other states have effectively been able to get Iran to cease its weapons proliferation ac218
tivities and engage in dialogue. Those states and organizations that
have negotiated these concessions with Iran cannot be so blind as to
think that the settlement was entirely in spite of United States action
in Iraq.219 Whether they think the attack on Iraq was necessary, it is
hard to argue that preemption has not added a necessary credible en220
forcement dimension to NPT obligations.

218. While the analogy to the “good cop-bad cop” rational can become strained if relied on
too much, it is clear the United States has teetered on a line between multilateral action in Iran
and North Korea while at the same time being more unilateral with Iraq. See, e.g., BBC News,
E.U.
Draft
Iran
Nuclear
Timetable,
Nov.
22,
2004,
at
www.newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps.pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/ (last visited Jan 3,
2005); Craig S. Smith, U.S. Softens Its Rebuke on Iran Nuclear Issue, Appeasing Allies, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004, at A1 (noting the United States’ continued approach of standing down
and allowing diplomatic measures to be used in Iran); Weisman, supra note 205 (noting the ongoing talks with North Korea).
219. The complexities of the United States role with the rest of the world community has
been a topic of much discussion and numerous books are available that take various different
stances on the proper way the United States should act and the way the other countries should
respond to the United States. See generally, e.g., KAGAN, supra note 147 (proving the most pronounced statement as to the inevitable differences between the United States and Europe in
what problems each seeks to address and by what means they will address those problems);
BENJAMIN R. BARBER, FEAR’S EMPIRE: WAR, TERRORISM, AND DEMOCRACY (2003) (providing a criticism of the Bush Doctrine and stating the need for more liberal, multilateral action).
220. However, I do concede that preemptive use of force may have the effect of pushing
proliferation underground and will add an additional burden to intelligence resources as additional funding and ingenuity will be necessary to ferret out these WMD programs before they
develop to a point.
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Preemption is a tool in the nonproliferation toolbox—it should in
no way be the first and only tool to be used. Looking at the Bush
Doctrine itself, it is important to note that preemption is not the only
mechanism to address weapons proliferation.221 From the Bush administration’s first presentations of its doctrine of preemptive selfdefense, one must remember that it was one pillar within the overall
game-plan to address the threat of weapons of mass destruction.222
Multilateral regimes (through the NPT and IAEA), deterrence, counterproliferation, preemption, and any other tools available need to be
fully exploited in a seamless, unified effort, and all parties in the fight
against WMD proliferation need to understand that no single element
is the “correct” one that must be used all the time.223
Preemption will likely be counterproductive and dangerous if not
applied in some consistent way and accepted as a legitimate tool of
nonproliferation—this means the United States needs to move beyond the rhetoric that has accompanied its preemptive actions to this
date. An overambitious enforcement regime characterized solely by
preemption will have the effect of making the United States the
world’s policeman, a role that it has feared and loathed undertaking,
224
leaving other states insecure about their role in international affairs.
Additionally, in order for this preemption to ever have any chance of
acceptance after the diplomatic debacle in Iraq, the United States will
have to be willing to allow multilateral input on the intricacies of any
such a plan. Yet in a current environment where unilateral action is
chic, the tolerance for such a framework is questionable. However,
like in any “good cop-bad cop” plan, the “bad cop” needs to understand the game only can go so far. The United States has proven in
Iraq that it is not bluffing when it proposes preemption, but that does

221. National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, supra note 6, at 2.
222. Id. at 5 (noting that all aspects of the policy, including multilateralism, intelligence
gathering, and preemption, need to be integrated).
223. As is noted, the United States, while a hegemon, cannot rely on it military strength
alone to stop weapons that can be hidden with ease given modern technology. Remember the
“Model T” of nuclear weapons could be transported in an airplane and as the events of the last
year have proven, no single means of controlling nuclear proliferation can be successful. See
Zelikow, supra note 135, at 19 (noting that multilateralism is key in stating that “[w]e must
speak of American power and of responsible ways to wield it; let us stop talking of American
empire, for there is and there will be no such thing”).
224. It has been generally acknowledged that United States is the primary enforcer of international law and international norms as it is the only country that has the potential to quickly
and easily interdict in world conflict. KAGAN, supra note 147, at 46–47 (analyzing the Balkan
War of 1999 as an example of the United States being the only country that could easily move
forces into an area where Europe should have been able to mobilize with ease).
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not mean that the preemption card needs to be played every time the
225
state fits the paradigm discussed above. Additionally, it is not acceptable for the United States to simply allow others to be involved in
multilateral efforts.226 While there are certain places where other
states should take the lead in diplomacy, the apparent need to drag
the United States to the table in certain situations (like Iran and
North Korea) hurts the United States ability to capitalize on the
strength and conviction it has shown on the issue of WMD proliferation.227 Other states must also not take a simple view that preemption
is the only tool the United States is willing to use as it has proven with
its acceptance of multilateral dialogue and diplomatic mechanisms in
Iran, North Korea, and Libya.
The current situation in North Korea presents a true testing
ground for the full Bush nonproliferation framework including possible preemption, and whether it will help or hurt the environment for
bringing about an effective settlement to North Korea’s nuclear
brinksmanship. While Donald Rumsfeld has stated that military action in North Korea is on the table, preemptive use of force, while an
effective tool, can only be brought to bear when it will be effective in
producing compliance with NPT regimes and will not unleash devastating attacks in itself. While it is practical to realize that Iraq and
North Korea are not the same state and have different propensities, a

225. Indeed, the administration has stated that preemption is the last alternative that should
be followed, and that preemption is to be considered only in grave circumstances. Zelikow, supra note 135, at 27. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice specifically noted the limited
circumstance when preemption can be used:
[Preemption] must be treated with great caution. The number of cases in which it
might be justified will always be small. It does not give a green light—to the United
States or any other nation—to act first without exhausting other means, including diplomacy. Preemptive action does not come at the beginning of a long chain of effort.
The threat must be very grave. And the risks of waiting must far outweigh the risks of
action.
Condoleezza Rice, Wriston Lecture (Oct. 1, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/
news/releases/2002/10/20021001-6.html (last visited June 16, 2004). When preemption is used in
a situation where alternative means are available, the doctrine loses any sense of morality that
could possibly accompany it (and morality is likely necessary if such a doctrine has the potential
to be legitimately accepted under international law).
226. At the same time, the United States can see the benefit from other states exploiting
contacts to these rogue states. Russia was instrumental in getting an agreement with Iran to allow unfettered inspection because of its conditioning additional nuclear fuel on Iran allowing
inspections. Fathi, supra note 3.
227. Parisa Hafezi, Iran Says EU Nuclear, Trade Talk Going Well, REUTERS, Jan. 16, 2004,
at http://www.alertnet.org/thenews.newsdesk/L16611732.htm (noting positive negotiations with
between the European Union and Iran, however, European leaders say United States support
and approval is necessary).
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dangerous precedent will be created if North Korea is given a pass
sending the message that the key to developing weapons is to get far
enough in their WMD development through cheating and blaming
others for blatant violations of important NPT obligations.
CONCLUSION
Paradigms to deal with nuclear weapons management need to
adapt with a changing world rife with new threats. This note proposes integrating the Bush concept of preemptive self-defense with
the preexisting NPT regime as a more effective, no-tolerance mechanism for dealing with nuclear weapons. Such a policy will involve the
United States making a viable long-term commitments to international treaty obligations relating to nonproliferation and disarmament, continuously engaging allies and the major players in nonproliferation initiatives while maintaining the credible threat of
preemption discussed above. As nuclear technology becomes easier
to attain by rogue states and dangerous non-state actors, the United
States will have to win over the hearts and minds of states and organizations if such a doctrine of nonproliferation with teeth will work to
create a safer, nuclear-free world rather than a situation where the
United States is isolated from the world community.
Blake Klein*

*The author would like to thank Professor Scott Silliman for his insight during revisions to this
note.

